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WHAT’S WRONG WITH SENTENCING EQUALITY? 
Richard A. Bierschbach* and Stephanos Bibas** 
Equality in criminal sentencing often translates into equalizing out-
comes and stamping out variations, whether race-based, geographic, 
or random. This approach conflates the concept of equality with one 
contestable conception focused on outputs and numbers, not inputs 
and processes. Racial equality is crucial, but a concern with eliminat-
ing racism has hypertrophied well beyond race. Equalizing outcomes 
seems appealing as a neutral way to dodge contentious substantive 
policy debates about the purposes of punishment. But it actually privi-
leges deterrence and incapacitation over rehabilitation, subjective el-
ements of retribution, and procedural justice, and it provides little 
normative guidance for punishment. It also has unintended conse-
quences for the structure of sentencing. Focusing on outcomes cen-
tralizes power and draws it up to higher levels of government, sacri-
ficing the checks and balances, disaggregation, experimentation, and 
localism that are practically baked into sentencing’s constitutional 
framework. More flexible, process-oriented notions of equality might 
better give effect to a range of competing punishment considerations 
while still policing punishments for bias or arbitrariness. They also 
could bring useful nuance to equality debates that swirl around re-
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storative justice, California’s Realignment experiment, federal use of 
fast-track plea agreements, and other contemporary sentencing prac-
tices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
NE concern dominates much of modern criminal justice: equality. 
The Warren Court created the field of constitutional criminal pro-
cedure with its efforts to rein in racist local law enforcement half a cen-
tury ago. Ever since, scholars, policymakers, and activists have sought to 
make equal treatment of criminal defendants a central (if as yet unat-
tained) goal. Equality concerns undergird arguments about the right to 
counsel, litigation over stopping and frisking drivers and pedestrians, 
claims of selective prosecution, and debates over police use of deadly 
force.1 In the field of sentencing—our main focus in this Article—
 
1 For a vivid example of the latter debate, consider the recent and highly publicized string 
of controversial shootings of unarmed African-American men, most of them by police, and 
the ensuing and serious critiques about the criminal justice system’s lack of engagement with 
racial equality. John Eligon, One Slogan, Many Methods: Black Lives Matter Enters Politics, 
O 
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equality concerns have propelled debate at least since the Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia.2 They are what gave 
birth to the sentencing-guidelines revolution, and they pervade critiques 
of everything from cooperation discounts and fast-track sentence depar-
tures to shaming punishments and restorative justice.3 
This Article turns a critical lens on how criminal justice has come to 
frame and operationalize equality in sentencing over the last forty years. 
Equality is a broad and nebulous concept, so before continuing, we 
should be more specific about how we use the term. At a very general 
level, equality means simply treating like cases alike.4 That of course in-
cludes, as the Warren Court made clear, not treating people differently 
on account of their race.5 But as we discuss in Part I, sentencing equality 
now reaches well beyond conscious or unconscious consideration of 
race, sex, or class to critique all other kinds of variations, including geo-
 
N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1SFUnQY (discussing the Black Lives Matter 
movement’s push for racial justice in the wake of the killings of Trayvon Martin and Mi-
chael Brown).  
2 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
3 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Un-
resolved Policy Issues, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1190, 1202 (2005); Thomas E. Gorman, Com-
ment, Fast-Track Sentencing Disparity: Rereading Congressional Intent to Resolve the Cir-
cuit Split, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 479, 480 (2010); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and Amer-
ican Criminal Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1880, 1940–42 (1991); Michael M. O’Hear, Is 
Restorative Justice Compatible with Sentencing Uniformity?, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 305, 306 
(2005); Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 
56 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 3 & n.3 (2003).  
4 William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1969, 1976 (2008); see also 
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 80 (2d ed. 
2008) (observing that “the ideal of justice” demands “treating morally like cases alike and 
morally different ones differently”); Vincent Chiao, Ex Ante Fairness in Criminal Law and 
Procedure, 15 New Crim. L. Rev. 277, 279 (2012) (doing something “equitably” means “in a 
manner that treats like cases alike”).  
5 The Warren Court’s procedural innovations for combatting racial inequality in criminal 
justice were aimed at police conduct, not sentencing. As scholars like Devon Carbado, Paul 
Butler, and many others have argued, while the goal of those innovations was to prevent ra-
cial profiling and harassment by the police, the extent to which they succeeded is another 
matter. See, e.g., Paul Butler, “A Long Step Down the Totalitarian Path”: Justice Douglas’s 
Great Dissent in Terry v. Ohio, 79 Miss. L.J. 9, 27, 29 (2009) (arguing that the individual-
ized suspicion requirement in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), evolved to become a “bless-
ing[] by some federal courts[] of racial profiling” and a “major contributor to the widespread 
antipathy toward the police that many people in minority and low-income communities 
demonstrate”); Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 
58 UCLA L. Rev. 1543, 1573–78 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s applications of Terry in 
the immigration context have exacerbated Terry’s effects of facilitating racial profiling and 
marginalizing the harms of racially selective policing). 
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graphic and jurisdictional variations.6 At that level of generality, the lan-
guage of equality often obscures the key question of what factors make 
cases relevantly alike or different. 
That is especially true given the shape that sentencing equality has 
taken on the ground. In sentencing, equality in practice looks rather dif-
ferent from equality in theory. In theory, egalitarian sentencing could fo-
cus on equalizing inputs or processes that determine punishment. But in 
practice, the sausage factory that is the American criminal justice system 
focuses not on equal inputs or fair processes but on uniform outputs—
equalizing the number of years in prison for each crime. Sentencing var-
iations—or, to use another oft-invoked term, disparities—are suspect, 
regardless of how or why they occur. Differences in bottom-line results 
are presumptively arbitrary, if not discriminatory. That is the particular 
conception of equality that we critique here. 
That outcomes-based emphasis frames a stale debate between equaliz-
ing outcomes and individualizing punishment. Mandatory minimum 
penalties, for instance, might eliminate disparities and achieve formal 
equality of punishments among offenders convicted of the same crime. 
But virtually no one would contend that they achieve individualized jus-
tice: The big fish deserve more punishment than the medium and small 
fry, even if they all violated the same statute. And indeed, for almost 
every area of sentencing where we see an equality-based argument on 
one side, we see an individualization argument on the other. The classic 
response to equality arguments pits equal justice against individual 
treatment, the reasons for rules against the virtues of discretion. The 
more we individualize sentences, the arguments usually go, the greater 
the risks that the system will produce sentencing disparities across cases. 
The equality versus individualization debate has been persistent and in-
tractable in sentencing scholarship and doctrine for decades—most fa-
mously in death-penalty jurisprudence, and more recently in limits on 
noncapital sentencing.7 
Our main goal in this Article is to disrupt the terms of this debate. We 
seek to expose how normatively complex issues of equality in sentenc-
 
6 See infra Section I.A.  
7 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469–70 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 
(2010); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976); Furman, 408 U.S. at 255; see also Mi-
chael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 14 (1996) (“[T]he result has been both to make punishment 
more severe and to create disparities as extreme as any that existed under indeterminate sen-
tencing.”). 
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ing are by showing how equality debates often mask other substantive 
and institutional considerations that lie at the heart of sentencing. Argu-
ments about equality and individualization, we contend, are often stand-
ins for more fundamental—and more complicated—debates about who 
decides sentencing issues, how they do so, and what purposes their deci-
sions should serve. Focusing on disparities without more threatens to 
bury these deeper institutional and substantive choices. 
Much of the work equality does when it comes to sentencing out-
comes is rhetorical. Calling variations “disparities” presupposes that 
equal outcomes are good and unequal outcomes are bad. But in many 
other areas of law and policy, variation is considered neutral or even a 
positive good. Consider, instead of the term “disparities,” the terms “dif-
ferences,” “diversity,” “pluralism,” “localism,” “heterogeneity,” or “la-
boratories of democracy.” The language of equality and disparity has 
obscured the more positive ways one can understand sentencing differ-
ences. 
The same holds true for the stale terms of the equality-
individualization debate. When it comes to institutional design and the 
substantive goals and values that underlie punishment, equality and in-
dividualization push in very different directions. As operationalized in 
criminal justice, equality reforms tend to centralize punishment and con-
centrate power.8 They are unitary and lead to top-down, high-level over-
sight to ride herd on outliers, leaving little room for local governance 
and experimentalism. They also conceal and homogenize the underlying 
normative reasons to punish, often emphasizing quantifiable goals and 
ex ante approaches to punishment such as general deterrence while ex-
cluding or minimizing harder-to-codify factors like rehabilitation. Indi-
vidualization cuts the other way. It pushes toward decentralization, 
fragmentation, devolution, and difference.9 Individualization eschews 
easily quantifiable metrics in favor of a rough-and-tumble mix of com-
peting priorities that are hard to weigh ex ante. To favor one focus or the 
other is often to favor a certain approach to institutional design and cer-
 
8 Sentencing commissions are one example. 
9 The jury as the “conscience of the community” is a classic example. See McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987) (noting that “a capital sentencing jury representative of a 
criminal defendant’s community assures a ‘diffused impartiality’ in the jury’s task of ‘ex-
press[ing] the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.’” (al-
teration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 
(1975), then quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968))).  
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tain justifications for punishment. But the rhetoric of equality versus in-
dividualization elides these tradeoffs. That may well be part of its ap-
peal: It masks dissensus about substantive values and allocations of 
power, instead of tackling it head-on. 
Our interrogation of equality at sentencing intersects with a broader 
critique of sentencing discourse. Sentencing scholarship, with a few no-
table exceptions such as the writing on Apprendi v. New Jersey,10 has 
proceeded largely in isolation from broader conversations about checks 
and balances and federalism that have long informed fields like adminis-
trative law and state and local government law. Contrast that with, say, 
the scholarly field of policing, which has frequently been a site for de-
bates surrounding localism in criminal justice.11 The equality versus in-
dividualization framework obfuscates institutional design choices. But 
sentencing implicates basic issues of governmental design at least as 
much as do more traditional public law fields.12 Just as one can debate 
how much policing should reflect the felt needs and priorities of differ-
ent districts, counties, cities, neighborhoods, and even groups of people, 
so too can one engage in the same debates over sentencing. To see sen-
tencing in this light further complicates an approach to equality that 
privileges centralized over devolved power and certain goals of punish-
ment over others. 
Sentencing scholarship has also been surprisingly divorced from de-
bates in substantive criminal law. Criminal law theorists often aim to 
promote one or another justification for punishment: retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and so on. But equality per se is all 
but invisible in much substantive criminal law scholarship; theorists as-
sume in the abstract that whichever justification they favor will be ap-
plied with an equal hand.13 From that perspective, our critique of equali-
ty seems obvious. Conversely, criminal procedure scholars grapple with 
equality but rarely consider, let alone discuss, how it relates to the vari-
ous justifications for punishment and their implications for who sentenc-
 
10 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires any fact other 
than the fact of a prior conviction that increases a sentence beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum to be presented to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). 
11 The vast literature on community policing is a good example. See, e.g., Debra Living-
ston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and 
the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1997). 
12 W. David Ball, Why State Prisons?, 33 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 75, 102–11 (2014). 
13 See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 815, 
818–22 (2007). For a notable exception, see Chiao, supra note 4, at 279.  
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es, how, and why. From the procedural side of the divide, our simulta-
neous engagement with the purposes of punishment, equality, and insti-
tutional design seems foreign. This Article is part of our larger project to 
make the two fields converse: Criminal procedure should better serve 
the values that motivate substantive criminal law, while substantive 
criminal law must consider how its values are implemented in practice.14 
A number of scholars have attacked related issues from complemen-
tary angles. The late Bill Stuntz famously explored the pathological poli-
tics of pushing criminal justice up to the county, state, and federal lev-
els.15 Josh Bowers has contrasted juries’ equitable responsiveness with 
the legalistic blinders worn by criminal justice professionals.16 Heather 
Gerken has likewise shone a spotlight on local variation by juries.17 
Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan have endorsed local voters’ ability to in-
fluence gang-loitering ordinances and community policing, while Rich 
Schragger has sounded a cautionary note on those topics.18 And Rachel 
Barkow has written powerfully on how federalization and bureaucratiza-
tion have exalted judges at the expense of juries and executive clemen-
cy, squeezing out softer values such as mercy.19 Each of these authors 
has noted the complex interplay of equality concerns with criminal jus-
tice’s vertical and horizontal structures. Yet, with the partial exception 
of Rachel Barkow, no one has explored the intersection directly in the 
 
14 E.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into 
Criminal Procedure, 114 Yale L.J. 85, 127–28 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas & Bierschbach, In-
tegrating Remorse and Apology]; Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitution-
ally Tailoring Punishment, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 397, 426–27 (2013) [hereinafter Bierschbach 
& Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment]. 
15 E.g., William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 7 (2011); Stuntz, 
supra note 4, at 1974, 1981–82, 2031–32, 2040. 
16 E.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to 
Prosecute, 110 Colum L. Rev. 1655, 1660, 1673–77, 1688–92 (2010) [hereinafter Bowers, 
Legal Guilt]; Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 Wake For-
est L. Rev. 319, 322, 333–34, 340–42 (2012) [hereinafter Bowers, Normative Grand Juries].  
17 Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 30–
33 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down]; Heather K. Gerken, Second-
Order Diversity, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1099, 1136–39, 1184–87 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken, 
Second-Order Diversity]. 
18 Compare Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 86 Geo. L.J. 1153, 1162–66, 1171–84 (1998), and Tracey L. Meares & Dan 
M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Mo-
rales, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 197, 209–11, with Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Local-
ism, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 371, 404–35, 461–72 (2001).  
19 E.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise 
of Mercy, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332, 1334–36, 1339–51 (2008). 
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context of sentencing, even though equality arguments have spurred 
much of the sentencing reform and commentary over the last four dec-
ades.20 
Situating sentencing equality debates within that broader scholarly 
conversation helps to highlight that not all inequalities are created equal. 
Criminal justice scholars often complain about disparities in criminal 
case outcomes among different federal jurisdictions or different counties 
within the same state.21 But it is not at all clear that such disparities 
should be troubling per se. Neighborhood-by-neighborhood or even ju-
ry-by-jury variations based on differently weighing competing purposes 
of punishment and other tradeoffs might not be problematic, or at least 
might be subject to richer debate. They can contribute to broader public 
conversations about how to balance retribution, public safety, cost, rein-
tegration, and the like. They can operate as a useful feedback loop with-
out privileging any one approach to punishment over another. They can 
allow communities and even neighborhoods to experiment with what 
works and what does not, letting them explore different means of im-
plementing agreed-upon ends or determine which ends matter most to 
them.22 By contrast, variations based on race or other factors that violate 
 
20 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Les-
sons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 877 & n.29 (2009) [hereinafter Bar-
kow, Institutional Design] (noting the significant degree of prosecutorial control over sen-
tencing through charging); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s 
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 76–77, 88–
89, 117, 120–21 (2003) [hereinafter Barkow, Recharging the Jury]; see also Rachel E. Bar-
kow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of Sentenc-
ing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1973, 1988 n.68 (2006) (review-
ing equality-based critiques of sentencing). 
21 See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminat-
ing Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 307, 312–14 (2010); Gerald W. 
Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
161, 188–89 (1991). 
22 “Community” is a malleable, somewhat amorphous and ambiguous term that is more 
often bandied about than defined. To critics, “‘community’ is a very dangerous concept. It 
sometimes means very little, or nothing very coherent, and sometimes means so many things 
as to become useless in legal or social discourse.” Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and 
the Dangers of “Community,” 2003 Utah L. Rev. 343, 343, 348, 374; see also Schragger, 
supra note 18, at 387–459 (discussing and critiquing contractarian, deep, and dualist versions 
of “community”).  
 Though the concept’s boundaries are fuzzy and subject to debate or abuse, its core idea 
remains useful. We agree with Josh Bowers and Robert Weisberg, who have recognized that 
“the concept of community justice may serve as a useful heuristic—a stand-in for certain ill-
defined, but nevertheless worthwhile, aspirations from which contemporary professionalized 
criminal justice has moved too far away. . . . [W]e may successfully use the ‘vocabulary’ of 
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constitutional values remain deeply troubling. Sentencing equality could 
borrow the conceptual tiers of equal-protection scrutiny: Racial, ethnic, 
religious, and fundamental-rights discrimination would face strict scruti-
ny and virtually always be unconstitutional, whereas geographic and ju-
risdictional variations would be least troubling and merit deference on 
any rational basis. In evaluating disparities, sentencing equality could 
also pay more attention to the procedural and institutional structure that 
generated them. 
The remainder of this Article unfolds in three parts. Part I is about 
substance: how equality relates to the goals and values that sentencing 
serves. It shows how, in the sentencing context, equality has come to 
mean equalizing outcomes: that is, equalizing sentences and minimizing 
disparities. That conception of sentencing equality, it explains, privileg-
es ex ante, numbers-driven approaches to punishment over others, par-
ticularly those that emphasize more granular, less-quantifiable values. In 
practice, sentencing too often reduces equality to a sort of mathematics. 
Equality’s focus on outcomes also ignores or slights process-based con-
siderations, such as listening to defendants and victims, reconciling 
them, and treating them fairly and respectfully. And even as a substan-
tive standard, equality of sentencing outcomes has little helpful content. 
The notion of treating like cases alike masks basic sentencing questions, 
such as what factors make cases relevantly alike, who should measure 
them against which purposes of punishment, and how to resolve con-
flicts among those purposes. To speak of equalizing outcomes is rhetori-
cally appealing, but it buries or glosses over such issues rather than 
providing useful guideposts for resolving them, watering down equali-
ty’s focus, impact, and limits. 
Part II is about structure. It examines how emphasizing equality of 
outcomes influences how we design sentencing institutions. In practice, 
the institutions that individualize sentences based on granular, ex post, 
and process-oriented factors tend to be disaggregated decision-making 
bodies, like individual judges, probation officers, and sentencing juries, 
and even plea-bargaining prosecutors and defense counsel. A focus on 
 
community without being used by it.” Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand 
Juries, supra note 16, at 322 (quoting Weisberg, supra, at 374). For present purposes, we de-
fine communities geographically and in terms of the impact of crime and criminal justice, as 
“[l]ocals affected by a particular crime.” Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Partici-
pation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 914 & n.6 (2006); accord Bowers, 
Normative Grand Juries, supra note 16, at 322 n.15 (quoting and adopting this definition). 
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equalizing outcomes thus has a centripetal force to it, pulling sentencing 
away from those bodies to more centralized, higher-level institutions 
like sentencing commissions. That centralizing effect interacts in previ-
ously unexamined ways with structural constitutional principles like 
checks and balances and federalism, complicating equality’s heavy em-
phasis in practice on uniformity of outcomes. Drawing in part on feder-
alism and localism scholarship, Part II shows how variations can both be 
the product of and advance crucial values of diversity, innovation, par-
ticipation, and responsiveness that we often celebrate in other contexts. 
Those values should carry weight in the sentencing context as well, 
where issues like who decides and how they do so are so central to sen-
tencing’s legitimacy and substance that they are baked into our constitu-
tional framework. 
Part III brings our substantive and institutional critiques together. It 
focuses primarily on geographic sentencing variation, but also considers 
other sources of variation such as apparently random differences among 
decision makers and their varied value choices. Alternative conceptions 
of equality, it suggests, could put more emphasis on equalizing inputs or 
processes, giving better effect to the range of competing substantive 
considerations and institutions that inform sentencing. That approach is 
consistent with how much of criminal justice has operationalized equali-
ty outside of sentencing. It also better accommodates the different status 
of different kinds of inequalities. Using restorative justice, California’s 
Realignment initiative, and federal fast-track plea agreements as illustra-
tions, Part III shows how more flexible, less outcomes-driven approach-
es to equality could bring nuance to equality debates that color a range 
of sentencing innovations and practices. Restorative justice, for instance, 
deliberately deviates from equality of outcomes. But that objection is 
hardly fatal. Focusing myopically on variations in outcomes as inherent-
ly suspect blinds critics to how restorative processes can be inclusive, 
treat offenders and victims with equal dignity, and serve other weighty 
goals. The better criticisms of restorative justice are rooted not in out-
come inequality per se, but in how it might exacerbate inequalities that 
flow from differences in race, wealth, and power. 
One qualification is in order. Our mission here is primarily analytical 
and critical, and only secondarily normative. We do favor a less me-
chanical, less outcomes-focused approach to equality, especially for var-
iations unrelated to race, sex, and socioeconomic status. But our main 
goal is to show how sentencing equality, as it has come to be conven-
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tionally understood in outcomes-oriented terms, interacts with the insti-
tutional structure and goals of punishment, and how exposing that inter-
action complicates the tradeoffs that inhere in sentencing design.23 
Equality of outcomes in sentencing is an important heuristic for injus-
tice, but it can also deflect attention from political, policy, and structural 
choices. At the very least, when assessing equality in sentencing, we 
should be more sensitive to the benefits as well as the costs of variation, 
and to distinguishing good variations from bad. 
I. EQUAL OUTCOMES AND THE SUBSTANCE OF SENTENCING 
As criminal procedure took shape over the past half-century, judges 
and legislatures sought to eradicate discrimination by adopting rules to 
equalize outcomes. Though they were often motivated by racial fairness, 
often they articulated rules that formally had nothing to do with race. 
Today, as Section I.A shows, equality in sentencing has evolved from 
stamping out classic racial discrimination to promoting uniform sentenc-
ing outcomes across the board. Section I.B explains how this approach 
seems appealing as a neutral metric of fairness that brackets longstand-
ing and troublesome debates over why and how much to punish. But in 
practice, Section I.C contends, that value-free emphasis on equalizing 
outcomes privileges a few values over all others. It turns criminal justice 
largely into a deterrence- and incapacitation-driven equation, leaving lit-
tle room for rehabilitation, mercy, or subjective elements of retribution, 
and slighting important process values along the way. 
A. The Rise of Equal Outcomes 
Until the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. Constitution and federal 
courts had little involvement with state criminal justice, which handles 
most criminal cases. The Bill of Rights applied only to the actions of the 
federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause had little independent bite. But in a series of cases, often involv-
 
23 As Gerken put it when drawing connections between the federalism and local govern-
ment literatures in her Harvard Law Review foreword, “If we can show that federalism’s 
signature vices can be recast as plausible virtues, the odds are that there are other areas 
where the cost-benefit analysis is more complicated than we typically assume.” Gerken, 
Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 17, at 46; see also Gerken, Second-Order Diversi-
ty, supra note 17, at 1103. Our methodology and analytical approach in this Article are simi-
lar to hers. 
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ing racial or ethnic aspects and Southern states, the Court interpreted due 
process expansively, read it as incorporating the Bill of Rights, and ap-
plied its protections to the states. Powell v. Alabama first recognized the 
right to appointed counsel to protect the Scottsboro boys, all black 
youths, against a legalized lynching for allegedly raping young white 
women.24 Miranda v. Arizona mandated its famous Miranda warnings to 
protect an “indigent Mexican defendant . . . with pronounced sexual fan-
tasies” and “an indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of 
school in the sixth grade.”25 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville struck 
down as void for vagueness a vagrancy ordinance used to target young 
black males who were cruising around town with young white women in 
northern Florida very late one Saturday night.26 Furman v. Georgia in-
validated the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment in the con-
text of three black defendants in Georgia and Texas, two of whom had 
raped white women.27 In support, Justices Douglas and Marshall cited 
evidence that blacks were disproportionately likely to be executed.28 
When the Supreme Court restored the death penalty four years later, it 
emphasized the need for “‘clear and objective standards so as to produce 
non-discriminatory application’” and limit “arbitrariness and caprice.”29 
Though many of these cases aimed to combat racial prejudice, their 
rules swept much more broadly against all unexplained variation. As 
Justice Stewart put it in his Furman concurrence, while race was the on-
ly discernible basis for imposing the death sentences before the Court, 
race discrimination had not technically been proven. What had been 
shown was that the defendants had been “capriciously selected” to die, 
and the Eighth Amendment forbids imposing capital punishment “so 
wantonly and so freakishly.”30 In other words, racial bias was—and still 
is—natural to suspect but hard to prove, so that fear understandably bred 
hostility to variation writ large. 
 
24 287 U.S. 45, 49–52 (1932). See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of 
Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 48, 48–49 (2000) (discussing why the flagrant 
racial injustices spurred the Supreme Court to act and how popular opinion generally sup-
ported the Court’s actions to combat egregious unfairness). 
25 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966). 
26 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972) (describing the arrest as “early on a Sunday morning”). 
27 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). 
28 Id. at 249–53 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 364–65 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
29 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 
615 (Ga. 1974)). 
30 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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The Supreme Court’s movement to use rules to equalize disparate 
outcomes in capital sentencing and elsewhere filtered down to lower 
court judges, legislatures, and other actors. And like the Court’s rulings, 
these rules reached well beyond racial discrimination to attack all sorts 
of variation. Most notably, in his 1973 book on sentencing, Judge 
Marvin Frankel worried that traditional, unstructured sentencing left 
judges free to discriminate, apply their idiosyncratic beliefs, or simply 
be arbitrary because of what they had eaten for breakfast that day.31 
Though he adverted briefly to racial, class, and religious biases, his fears 
rested in large part on survey evidence and anecdotes unrelated to race.32 
“[I]ndividualized justice,” he contended, “is prima facie at war with such 
concepts, at least as fundamental, as equality, objectivity, and consisten-
cy in the law.”33 He denounced sentencing discretion as “almost wholly 
unchecked and sweeping,” a grant of power “terrifying and intolerable 
for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law.”34 Thus, he pro-
posed creating an administrative agency to promulgate rules to bind sen-
tencing judges.35 
Judge Frankel’s book ignited a sentencing-reform movement across 
the country, culminating in sentencing guidelines governing not only 
federal criminal justice but also almost half of the states.36 Liberal re-
formers such as Senator Edward Kennedy initially embraced sentencing 
reform as an “antidiscrimination measure.”37 But their target broadened 
beyond race as they joined forces with law-and-order conservatives, who 
feared judicial leniency. Both sides shared “a deep suspicion of discre-
tionary judgment,” so they agreed to centralize power in the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission to write binding rules.38 The result was a mathe-
matical, rather than a nuanced or moral, approach to justice and equality. 
Other actors likewise supported adopting rules to ensure uniform out-
comes. Representatives of the U.S. Department of Justice have support-
ed mandatory minimum penalties to promote uniform sentencing by 
 
31 Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 5–11 (1973). 
32 Id. at 17–24, 32–34, 42–43. 
33 Id. at 10. 
34 Id. at 5. 
35 Id. at 121–22. 
36 Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal 
Courts 35–59 (1998); Frase, supra note 3, at 1194–96, 1196 tbl.1. 
37 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 36, at 38. 
38 Id. at 39–40. 
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treating like cases alike.39 As Asa Hutchinson, a former U.S. Attorney, 
member of the House of Representatives, and later DEA Administrator 
and now Governor of Arkansas put it: “[Y]ou have to have a sentencing 
pattern that has uniformity across it, that sends the right signals . . . .”40 
Likewise, federal and state legislatures mandated zero-tolerance policies 
for possessing drugs and guns on school campuses, in part to guarantee 
equal treatment for these offenses.41 
Al Alschuler perceptively diagnosed this approach to sentencing re-
form as “a mechanistic view of equality,” in which social scientists “ap-
pear to have treated equality as a self-defining concept, overlooking its 
normative character.”42 Scholars praise sentencing reforms for reducing 
disparities in outcomes, but in doing so they overaggregate convictions 
for the same criminal charge, even when offenders and facts differ in 
other respects. In doing so, they bury the question of what makes cases 
alike in respects that merit alike or different sentences.43 James Whitman 
agrees that “thirty years after the sentencing revolution commenced, and 
despite the travails of the Federal Guidelines, the campaign for equality 
in punishment has attained something like the status of political ortho-
doxy in the United States today.”44 Though it quintessentially targets 
 
39 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Jus-
tice System 85–86 (2011).  
40 Judge Stanley Sporkin & Congressman Asa Hutchinson, Debate at Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center (March 2, 1999), in Mandatory Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A Valuable 
Weapon in the War on Drugs or a Handcuff on Judicial Discretion?, 36 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
1279, 1295 (1999); see Gov. Asa Hutchinson, Arkansas’s Governore, http://governor.arka
nsas.gov/governor-hutchinson [https://perma.cc/E353-T8AV].  
41 Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–382, Title I, § 101, 108 Stat. 3907 (cod-
ified as amended 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994)) (repealed 2002); Drug-Free Schools and Com-
munities Act Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–226, § 22, 103 Stat. 1928, 1938 (codi-
fied as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1145g (1989)) (repealed 1998); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & 
Anthony J. DeMarco, Weapons in Schools and Zero Tolerance, Crim. Just., Spring 1996, at 
46; see also Rebecca Morton, Note, Returning “Decision” to School Discipline Decisions: 
An Analysis of Recent, Anti-Zero Tolerance Legislation, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 757, 773 
(2014) (observing that “[w]hile zero tolerance policies may have been instituted as a well-
intentioned way to discipline students equally,” they “do not necessarily treat students fairly” 
because “sameness is not always fair” and “subjectivity in the disciplinary process is inevi-
table” in any event  (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
42 Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggrega-
tion, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 915–18, 915 n.51 (1991) (capitalization omitted) (collecting 
scholarly articles adopting this approach). 
43 Id. 
44 James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. 
Legal Analysis 119, 129–30 (2009). 
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discrimination and bias, the sentencing-equality movement also seeks to 
combat dispersion of outcomes more generally.45 
Many academics share this broad embrace of sentence equality as a 
goal to be maximized, not just against race-based variation but even for 
geographic or random variations across or within districts. The late Dan 
Markel forcefully criticized randomness and intra- as well as inter-judge 
sentence disparities as impermissible moral luck, quite apart from bias 
or discrimination.46 Adam Gershowitz is deeply troubled that capital-
punishment rates vary dramatically not only by state but also by county, 
even though all prosecutors are supposed to be enforcing uniform 
statewide laws. He dismisses different prosecutors weighing costs dif-
ferently as an “arbitrariness problem.”47 Wayne Logan complains that 
the “balkanization of the criminal law” unambiguously “threatens une-
qual treatment” while acknowledging that it does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.48 Steven Clymer and Sara Sun Beale, among others, 
decry outcome disparities between federal and local punishments of 
street crime as at worst violations of equal protection and at best incom-
patible with basic notions of equity.49 One of us has even earlier argued 
that local variations in federal law enforcement require justification, and 
that differing local values or strategies may not justify regional varia-
tions.50 These arguments echo Cesare Beccaria’s much earlier conten-
tion, quite apart from fears of bias, that in order to be effective, punish-
ments must be uniform.51 
 
45 See id. at 128; see also id. at 120 (noting that “over the past thirty-five years” American 
criminal justice “has been the scene of a vigorous campaign to guarantee that all persons 
who commit the same offense should serve the same sentence,” and observing that the 
American system “seem[s] deeply committed to the proposition that all offenders who com-
mit comparable offenses ought to suffer . . . comparable punishments”). 
46 Dan Markel, Luck or Law: Is Indeterminate Sentencing Unconstitutional? 58–81 (Nov. 
19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
47 Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 312–21. 
48 Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 Ohio St. 
L.J. 1409, 1460, 1465–67 (2001). 
49 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Lim-
its for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 Hastings L.J. 979, 997–1004 (1995); Steven D. 
Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 643, 675–
97 (1997). 
50 Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 
137, 140 (2005). 
51 See Cesare Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments 93, 158–59 (Edward D. In-
graham trans., 2d Am. ed., Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin 1819).  
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The bottom line is that while sentencing equality took flight to com-
bat racial discrimination, it now extends well beyond racial bias or even 
racially disparate outcomes. Courts, legislatures, and pundits reflexively 
mistrust variations, whether or not they are caused by or even correlate 
with constitutionally suspect classifications. No one believes that every 
murderer, drug dealer, or thief need be sentenced identically to every 
other. But when it comes to equality, the name of the game is to at least 
make sure that their punishments are substantially similar, no matter 
who sentences them or where within a sovereign territory they happen to 
commit their crimes. Equality in sentencing, in practice, very often 
means standardizing punishments. 
B. The Appeal of Equal Outcomes 
Given the complex and messy nature of sentencing, with its range of 
competing considerations and lack of easy answers, it is unsurprising 
that opposing sides have coalesced around outcomes as the measure of 
sentencing equality. Equality of outcomes is intuitively appealing as a 
metric for punishment. Equalizing outcomes seems like a neutral, almost 
mathematical criterion of justice. Bottom-line results seem to speak for 
themselves, irrespective of motives or reasons. From childhood, we 
learn to object that it is not fair if a sibling gets more of a dessert or a 
present. Equal pay for equal work is an appealing slogan, and not just in 
the context of race or sex discrimination. Employers that publish sala-
ries, such as public universities, feel enormous pressure to equalize pay 
and peg all variations to seniority, even among white males. Merit pay, 
by contrast, touches off a firestorm, in part because few can agree on 
how to measure merit.52 
In a world with pluralistic, diverse views about the purposes and goals 
of punishment, disagreement about how to sentence similarly situated 
offenders is almost inherent in the system. On some level, treating like 
cases alike seems easy. Criminal justice professionals define a category 
of cases as alike based on the crime of conviction, and then expect to see 
more or less equal prison sentences for the cases within that box.53 
 
52 See, e.g., Lyle Leritz, Econ. Research Inst., Principles of Merit Pay 1 (2012), http://w
ww.erieri.com/PDF/Principles-of-Merit-Pay.pdf [https://perma.cc/RHP8-W9D7] (“Since 
many criteria used to measure performance are highly subjective, it can be difficult to objec-
tively evaluate employees,” and thus merit.).   
53 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1673–78, 1703. 
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Treating unlike cases unalike seems much harder. A few grounds for 
varying sentences are widely accepted, such as differences in crimes 
charged and criminal records. But other differences, such as motive or 
intent, are far more debatable both in fact finding and normatively.54 
Even the relevance of resulting harm is disputed, though less so than 
other factors.55 Should we automatically sentence defendants alike simp-
ly because they are all charged under the same statute, or stole the same 
amount of money, or have the same number of strikes on their rap 
sheets? The problem is not that people agree that other factors are large-
ly irrelevant to punishment. On the contrary, most would agree that 
much else matters too. It is that people cannot (or seem unable to) agree 
about which factors matter, how much, and why. 
The result is intractable debates over retribution, deterrence, incapaci-
tation, rehabilitation, and the like. One person says youth should miti-
gate punishment because it makes the defendant less blameworthy and 
more amenable to rehabilitation. Another views youths as dangerous 
predators who are at their violent, testosterone-fueled peak and need to 
be deterred and incapacitated.56 One judge views mentally disabled or 
drug-addicted defendants as less blameworthy. Another views them as 
less able to exercise self-control and so more dangerous.57 One prosecu-
tor views a well-off college student as having a more promising future 
and posing less of a threat. Another insists that he is more culpable be-
cause he has had more opportunities in life and should have known bet-
 
54 Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 89, 89 
(2006) (proposing that motive play an expanded role within the context of criminal punish-
ment in order to increase sentencing uniformity, with the resulting clarification of “the ag-
gravating and mitigating nature of various motives ex ante”). 
55 See, e.g., Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Sub-
jectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 907, 908, 913 (2010). 
56 Compare Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012) (Kagan, J.) (noting mitigat-
ing characteristics of juvenile defendants), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010) 
(Kennedy, J.) (same), with Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (expressing 
skepticism that “society should show greater mercy to young killers”), and Graham, 560 
U.S. at 118 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referencing research suggesting that “an adolescent of-
fender’s antisocial behavior is not transient”).  
57 Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002) (Stevens, J.) (arguing that “men-
tally retarded persons” are less culpable than other serious adult offenders “[b]ecause of their 
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses), with id. at 351 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “mentally retarded offenders” who commit “extreme 
crimes” are appropriate objects of “society’s moral outrage”). 
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ter.58 The disagreements are particularly pronounced over offender char-
acteristics, though they also extend to offenders’ states of mind, victims’ 
suffering and views, and many other issues too.59 
Philosophers, theologians, moralists, and lawyers have long fought on 
the same hoary battlefield. Many of these disagreements stem from fun-
damental differences in worldview and outlook. Some people emphasize 
subjective blameworthiness, others objective harm or suffering caused, 
others the temptations to commit crime, and still others the danger and 
fear posed by crime. Some emphasize free will and individual moral re-
sponsibility, while others point to economic circumstances and broader 
social forces. The debates are endless, ebbing and flowing but with no 
resolution in sight. 
Equalizing outcomes, at first blush, offers a neutral way around this 
clash. Equality of outcomes shunts the sages aside in favor of statisti-
cians and social scientists. It avoids contentious moral judgments and 
debates over whether to favor retribution, deterrence, or some other jus-
 
58 Compare, e.g., Paul Elias, Brock Turner Leaves Jail, Gets Hate Mail for Sexual Assault, 
Associated Press, Sep. 2, 2016, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/54d251e85e694c33a0327af6cc2
81d5a/ex-stanford-swimmer-leaves-jail-after-serving-half-his-term [https://perma.cc/385D-
76VM] (reporting that the judge sentencing college student Brock Turner to six months in 
jail for three felony sexual assault counts cited “‘extraordinary circumstances’ of Turner's 
youth, clean criminal record and other considerations in departing from the minimum sen-
tence of two years in prison”), with Nick Anderson & Susan Svrluga, Prosecutors Urgerd 
“Substantial Prison Term” in Stanford Sexual Assault Case, Records Show, Wash. Post 
(June 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/06/11/prosec
utors-urged-substantial-prison-term-in-stanford-sexual-assault-case-records-show/ [https://p
erma.cc/EDJ2-5R52] (stating that prosecutors in Brock Turner's case argued that “the fact 
that the Defendant preyed upon an intoxicated stranger on a college campus should not be 
viewed as a less serious crime than if he were to assault a stranger in Downtown Palo Alto”), 
and Christina Cauterucci, Brock Turner’s Father Sums Up Rape Culture on One Brief 
Statement, Slate (June 5, 2016), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2016/06/05/brock_t
urner_s_dad_s_defense_proves_why_his_victim_had_to_write_her_letter.html [https://pe
rma.cc/K53K-U5KT] (reporting on the victim statement provided in Brock Turner's prosecu-
tion, in which the victim argued that the defendant's athletic talent and loss of a swimming 
scholarship at a prestigious university should not reduce the severity of his sentence).  
59 See, e.g., Antony Duff, Principle and Contradiction in the Criminal Law: Motives and 
Criminal Liability, in Philosophy and the Criminal Law 156, 171 (Anthony Duff ed., 1998) 
(discussing the contradiction among courts regarding the relevancy of motive in sentencing); 
Joe Frankel, Payne, Victim Impact Statements, and Nearly Two Decades of Devolving 
Standards of Decency, 12 N.Y.C. L. Rev. 87, 114–15 (2008) (discussing differences in state 
courts’ use of victim impact evidence); Carissa Byrne Hessick, A Critical View of the Sen-
tencing Commission’s Recent Recommendations to “Strengthen the Guidelines System,” 51 
Hous. L. Rev. 1335, 1354–55 (2014) (noting that there is a “widespread judicial disagree-
ment regarding the relevance and appropriateness of mitigating offender characteristics”). 
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tification for punishment. As Dan Kahan suggested in the context of de-
terrence, mathematical approaches to punishment have a “secret ambi-
tion,” that of “quiet[ing] illiberal conflict between contending cultural 
styles and moral outlooks.”60 Equalizing sentencing outcomes functions 
in just this way. Rather than fighting culture wars over the purposes of 
punishment or what makes offenders alike or different in meaningful 
ways, it is easier to bracket such normative questions or treat them as 
self-evident. That was the explicit approach of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission. To avoid moral disagreements, it explicitly eschewed any 
normative approach to punishment, and instead aimed largely to repli-
cate average past practices while reining in outliers.61 Where moral disa-
greement was endemic, math supplanted morality. 
C. The Limits of Equal Outcomes 
The apparent neutrality of equalizing sentencing outcomes is intui-
tively appealing as an even-handed approach on which all can agree. But 
this neutrality has its drawbacks. Because equality of outcomes is not 
self-defining—it does not specify which variations in outcomes are bad, 
and which are not—it does not offer much useful substantive guidance, 
distracting attention from discussion of both the prior normative com-
mitments that might animate it and the broader values punishment 
serves. At a deeper level, in practice, equalizing outcomes is far from 
equal. All justifications for punishment are supposedly equal, but some 
are more equal than others. General deterrence and incapacitation win 
out. Retribution gets homogenized in unappealing ways. Rehabilitation 
and mercy are shut out. And process values like respectful treatment and 
voice get overlooked. 
1. As a Normative Guidepost for Punishment 
Start with the fact that equality of sentencing outcomes is not self-
defining. When it comes to sentencing, equalizing outcomes simply 
means punishing like cases alike. So speaking about equality of out-
 
60 Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 415 (1999). 
61 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1A1.3 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2014) [hereinaf-
ter U.S.S.G.M.] (policy statement) (reporting that the U.S. Sentencing Commission side-
stepped the problem of “reconcil[ing] the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal 
punishment . . . by taking an empirical approach that used as a starting point data estimating 
pre-guidelines sentencing practice”).   
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comes is largely a shorthand for speaking about whether certain cases 
are alike in respects that are relevant to why we punish. If they are, they 
must be treated alike; if they differ in those ways, they should be treated 
differently. But standing alone, as Peter Westen observes, that principle 
is devoid of content.62 Surely two crimes need not be treated alike be-
cause they both happened on Thursdays. Nor must they differ just be-
cause their perpetrators had different hair colors or skin colors. Focusing 
on equalizing outcomes per se functions to bypass prior questions of 
morality, social psychology, and other factors that inform punishment 
determinations. But without a foundation to ground it, equality of out-
comes has no freestanding normative purchase. 
Multiple foundations might exist, of course. One obvious one lies in 
our criminal justice system’s abject failure on issues of racial justice. 
Decades of empirical work on racial disparities in arrest, prosecution, 
and sentencing have made clear that racial skew in the American crimi-
nal justice system is simultaneously endemic and extraordinarily diffi-
cult to uncover and prove.63 At the same time, disparate-impact reason-
ing is controversial, and the Supreme Court has proven unwilling to ex-
tend it to sentencing.64 Strict equality of sentencing outcomes based on 
objective criteria might be thought to serve as a prophylactic safeguard 
at the back end of the process, a last, formally neutral attempt to racially 
equalize a game that has been skewed against minority groups since its 
opening minutes. Beyond racial justice, other measures of substantive 
justice—whether rooted in nonarbitrariness, class, human dignity, or 
 
62 Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 543–48 (1982); see 
also Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1336, 1337 
(1997).  
63 See O’Hear, supra note 3, at 306 nn.6–9 (reviewing research on racial bias in the Ameri-
can criminal justice system); see also John Tyler Clemons, Note, Blind Injustice: The Su-
preme Court, Implicit Racial Bias, and the Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, 
51 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 689, 690–91 (2014) (citing examples of the vast racial disparities in-
fecting the system). 
64 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469–70 (1996) (holding that, in order to es-
tablish selective prosecution based on discriminatory effect, a defendant must show that sim-
ilarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 314–19 (1987) (concluding that a study showing that the death penalty was im-
posed more often on black defendants and killers of white victims than on white defendants 
and killers of black victims failed to establish any discriminatory purpose and, at most, mere-
ly indicated a discrepancy that appeared to correlate with race); see also Dorsey v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2326–30, 2336 (2012); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 261 
(2009); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 85–90 (2007).  
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what have you—might also provide the normative foundation that equal 
outcomes by itself lacks.65 
The goal here is not to defend or to isolate any of these or other prior 
normative commitments that might undergird equalizing sentencing out-
comes, which is likely an impossible task. Equality of outcomes in sen-
tencing, like punishment itself, appears badly overdetermined.66 The 
point is that once one defines which differences merit different sentenc-
ing treatment by reference to an underlying substantive theory, relabel-
ing those differences in terms of equal versus unequal outcomes adds lit-
tle to the picture.67 Indeed, it may obscure the specific racial or class ba-
sis that both justifies and limits the reach of outcomes-equalizing 
reforms. The rhetoric of equal outcomes undoubtedly carries symbolic 
weight in the scales, particularly as it concerns our sorry history of racial 
injustice. But employing it still assumes that we have already measured 
which dimensions make a sentence equal in relevant ways. Focusing on 
a certain kind of inequality (like racial bias) illuminates specific unjusti-
fiable variations. But the broader rhetoric of unequal outcomes itself, in 
practice lumping geographic, random, race-based, and many other kinds 
of variation together, threatens to mask underlying substantive guide-
posts and can conceal more than it reveals. 
2. As a Neutral Criterion for Punishment 
Focusing on equalizing sentencing outcomes can also distract atten-
tion from the substantive justifications for punishment and how they 
may cut in different directions. That is a great part of its appeal, at least 
as a discourse-management strategy. But it also has a downside. When it 
comes to the purposes and goals of punishment, emphasizing outcomes 
puts the cart before the horse. It lets a certain way of operationalizing 
equality dictate which justifications for punishment will dominate the 
 
65 See, e.g., Douglas Rae et al., Equalities 133 (1981) (finding more than one hundred ap-
proaches to giving content to the concept of equality). 
66 See Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restora-
tive Justice, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 205, 282 (discussing the overdetermined nature of sentencing 
in the United States). 
67 See Westen, supra note 62, at 543–48; see also Alschuler, supra note 42, at 918 (“Every 
empirical effort to measure disparity rests implicitly on a normative concept of appropriate 
sentencing criteria.”).  
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sentencing calculus, because some seem more neutral, mathematical, 
and consistent in their results.68 
General Deterrence and Incapacitation. When we emphasize equaliz-
ing outcomes, in practice that means privileging general deterrence and 
incapacitation. Both are easy to specify and quantify ahead of time. Nei-
ther depends much on discretion or qualitative evaluation. At most, 
prosecutors and judges must tally up a defendant’s convictions or strikes 
from his rap sheet, a fairly perfunctory process. 
General deterrence, in particular, is well served by threatening sanc-
tions across the board, clearly and ex ante, and promising to carry out 
those threats consistently. Prospective offenders can understand slogans 
or billboards that communicate “three strikes and you’re out” or “gun 
crime means hard time.” That is why Beccaria placed so much emphasis 
on uniformity.69 As noted above, advocates of mandatory minimum sen-
tences stress the importance of a “sentencing pattern that has uniformity 
across it, [to] send[] the right signals.”70 (Even so, deterrence arguably 
depends less on the predictability of sentences than on the predictability 
of arrest and conviction, which is much weaker in practice.71) Incapaci-
tation is likewise the primary aim of recidivism enhancements, three-
strikes laws, and the like.72 Conversely, proponents of individualizing 
punishments may bristle at the blunt, across-the-board measures needed 
to make general deterrence or perhaps incapacitation work.73 
 
68 To paraphrase the prominent Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Eco-
nomic Performance and Social Progress, chaired by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, we pay 
more attention to things that we can easily measure, but what is easily measureable is not 
always a good proxy for what we value or how much we value it. “What we measure,” in 
short, “affects what we do.” Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., Report by the Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress 7 (2009), [https://per
ma.cc/UNL6-L3WC]; Nobel Prizes and Laureates, Joseph E. Stiglitz – Facts, http://www.n
obelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001/stiglitz-facts.html [https://per
ma.cc/6LSP-9LML].  
69 Beccaria, supra note 51, at 149. 
70 Supra text accompanying note 40 (quoting Rep. Asa Hutchinson). 
71 See Whitman, supra note 44, at 142–43. 
72 See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as 
Criminal Justice, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1429, 1429–31, 1429 nn.2–8 (2001). 
73 They likely would not raise the same level of concern with selective incapacitation, 
which takes a more granular approach to determining individual defendants’ dangerous-
ness—a feature that, as we explain more below, has led critics to attack it on various equality 
grounds. See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
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Retribution. Retribution is sometimes confused with such punitive 
measures.74 But to the extent that such measures incorporate retribution 
at all, it is only the crudest forms of retribution, the eye-for-an-eye of the 
lex talionis. To ensure equality of outcomes, retribution is bastardized, 
mass-produced in Procrustean boxes on the punishment assembly line. 
To many, however, just deserts means something very different from 
getting tough or punishing mechanically. It requires considering not only 
the actus reus but also the offender’s mens rea and motivations. It de-
mands that punishments be proportionally based on a wide range of fac-
tors. It leaves room for partial justifications and excuses to reduce pun-
ishments. Grievance retributivism may give substantial weight to the 
victim’s suffering and need for vindication.75 And varieties of character 
retributivism also look carefully at the offender’s education, family, 
mental and emotional state, and awareness of the wrong done.76 As Paul 
Robinson’s empirical work finds, people’s retributive intuitions are sur-
prisingly nuanced. When given detailed case studies and asked to im-
pose a sentence, people vary punishments significantly based on a varie-
ty of such distinctions.77 
Thus, how one approaches sentencing equality can shape how one de-
fines retribution, or vice versa. A focus on equalizing outcomes can limit 
consideration of intent, motive, excuse, and offender characteristics.78 
Conversely, individualization leaves breathing room for more such con-
siderations. Some retributive theorists, like Dan Markel, focus on clearly 
 
74 See Tonry, supra note 7, at 184. 
75 Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 
UCLA L. Rev. 1659, 1686 (1992) (articulating a connection between retribution and victim 
vindication). 
76 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits 43 (2003) (“[O]ne’s deserts 
are a function not merely of one’s wrongful acts but also of the ultimate state of one’s char-
acter.”). 
77  Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hard-
ship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing 
Criminal Punishment, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 737, 789 tbl.8 (2012) (reporting substantial support 
for considering remorse, apology, rehabilitation, restitution, victims’ wishes, and hardship to 
others in lay punishment decisions); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Jus-
tice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3–4, 8–11 
(2007). 
78 See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 902 (“Situational and offender characteristics are as im-
portant as social harm in assessing sentences even from a ‘just deserts’ perspective, but these 
characteristics are almost impossible to quantify and to describe in general language.”). 
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defined, rule-like factors that legislatures can codify ex ante.79 Others, 
like Kyron Huigens, understand blame as a concrete, situational attribu-
tion that resists codification and has to be made ex post, ideally by a ju-
ry.80 The former approach to retribution fits much more easily with 
equality of outcomes than does the latter. 
Some of the blameworthiness factors omitted from raw punishment 
amounts do show up elsewhere in the system. They often inform low-
visibility but influential decisions by police and prosecutors not to arrest, 
to decline or divert charges, to plea bargain, and to strike cooperation 
deals, among other things.81 But the hydraulic pressures to dispose of 
cases quickly make these decisions invisible, unchecked, unaccountable, 
and highly variable. Those attributes run contrary to making sentencing 
rational and transparent, and they reinforce equality-based calls to stamp 
out such discretion and to harmonize outcomes to do justice. 
Rehabilitation and Reform. The justifications for punishment that best 
facilitate equalizing outcomes are those that legislatures, prosecutors’ 
offices, and sentencing commissions can specify ex ante. Conversely, 
justifications that require examining defendants as individuals, ex post, 
get squeezed out by the push for equal sentencing outcomes. Take reha-
bilitation. In the mid-twentieth century, Justice Hugo Black praised the 
“prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should 
fit the offender and not merely the crime. The belief no longer prevails 
that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punish-
ment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender.”82 
 
79 Markel & Flanders, supra note 55, at 954 n.177 (“[T]he nature of the punishment for a 
particular offense should also be determined ex ante through legislative deliberation . . . .”). 
80  Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 Geo. L.J. 387, 432–34 (2002) (argu-
ing that jury fact finding for “positive fault considerations,” and unstructured/indeterminate 
sentencing, are constitutionally required because fault and proportionality “cannot be deter-
mined ex ante by a system of rules.”); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1423, 1462–67 (1995) (conceiving of criminal punishment as a particularistic inquiry 
into virtue, well suited to juries’ ex post decision making, following Aristotle). 
81 See Malcolm M. Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower 
Criminal Court 159–61 (1979) (“[T]here is . . . a desire to look beyond the charges, to re-
spond directly to the incident itself and to the character of the defendant. For a charge to as-
sume meaning it must be given substantive content supplied by a description of the incident 
and information about the defendant’s character, habits, and motivation.”); see also Donald 
J. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial 139 (1966) 
(describing how a “major purpose” of both declination decisions and negotiated pleas is to 
“individualize justice” for “defendants who . . . do not seem to deserve the full consequences 
of conviction and sentencing”).  
82 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (citation omitted). 
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To effectuate that philosophy, rehabilitation gave power to probation 
and parole officers to determine ex post when an offender had turned 
over a new leaf.83 
Rehabilitation’s back-end variation was at odds with equalizing out-
comes, and that was a large part of its downfall. Congress, in enacting 
the Sentencing Reform Act, objected that parole boards’ “unfettered dis-
cretion” to gauge rehabilitation bred “an unjustifiably wide range of sen-
tences.”84 The truth-in-sentencing movement abolished parole in order to 
make sentences honest, clear, and predictable up front. The movement 
rejected rehabilitation in part to promote general deterrence and equali-
ty.85 
The focus on equalizing outcomes thus limits room for rehabilitation 
or its cousin, moral reform. Judges can, however, still exercise discretion 
within narrow ranges, police can decline to arrest, and prosecutors can 
decline to charge or can strike bargains. The role of discretion shows up 
most prominently in declination and diversion programs, whose admis-
sion criteria may gauge a defendant’s amenability to rehabilitation.86 The 
effect of these programs may be to decriminalize a large swath of low-
level “junk” cases via the back door, with little oversight, or possibly 
heavier sentences for the fraction who fail treatment.87 The contrast for 
equality is stark: rule-bound sentencing premised on equalizing out-
comes for the many felony cases tracked through the regular system, 
versus vast rehabilitative discretion with far greater outcome variation 
 
83 See id. at 248. 
84 S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221 (com-
mittee report to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). 
85 Melissa Hamilton, McSentencing: Mass Federal Sentencing and the Law of Unintended 
Consequences, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 2199, 2206–07 (2014) (reviewing history of truth-in-
sentencing movement at the federal level). 
86 See Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 165, 182 
(2013); John Clark, Pretrial Justice Inst., The Role of Traditional Pretrial Diversion in the 
Age of Specialty Treatment Courts: Expanding the Range of Problem-Solving Options at the 
Pretrial Stage 9 (2007), http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/PJI%20The%20Ro
le%20of%20.Traditional%20Pretrial%20Diversion%20in%20the%20Age%20of%20Sp
ecialty%20Treatment%20Courts%20(2007).pdf [https://perma.cc/5TL4-TDS4].  
87 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 783, 792–820 
(2008); Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1437, 1475–79, 
1501–07 (2000) [hereinafter Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal]; Morris B. Hoffman, Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Danger-
ous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 2063, 2067 (2002) [hereinafter 
Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence]. 
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for the (predominantly) misdemeanors and violations that are dismissed 
or pushed out of sight to problem-solving courts. 
Mercy. Perhaps the most striking effect of the turn toward equalizing 
outcomes is the demise of mercy as an important value in sentencing. 
Utilitarians object that it undercuts deterrence; act-based retributivists 
object that it varies punishments for the same criminal act. Beccaria 
made the point centuries ago, denouncing pardons and clemency as 
“dangerous!” because they “nourish the flattering hope of impunity” and 
so undercut the law’s consistent “example.”88 Contemporary punishment 
scholars follow Beccaria, trying to stamp out mercy in the name of 
equality, even if they do so in order to equalize retribution rather than 
deterrence. Dan Markel, in Against Mercy, objected strenuously that 
people “committed to the principle of equal liberty under law [should] 
be against mercy.”89 His critique extended far beyond discrimination: 
“[M]ercy based on compassion is just as problematic as mercy motivat-
ed by bias or caprice.”90 Jeffrie Murphy suggests that mercy raises an 
equal-protection-type problem, because it threatens to treat like cases 
unalike.91 And Rachel Barkow perceptively observes that in our increas-
ingly rule-governed system, discretion to individualize punishments and 
show mercy seems lawless, though she criticizes this trend. Our admin-
istrative model of specifying rules ex ante is at odds with holistic, par-
ticularistic review ex post, in the context of concrete cases.92 
Process Values. When our approach to sentencing equality focuses on 
equalizing outcomes, it slights how we get to the moment of punishment 
and what happens along the way. Lawyers instinctively focus on bot-
 
88 Beccaria, supra note 51, at 158–59. 
89 Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1421, 1425 (2004). 
90 Id. 
91 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, 
Forgiveness and Mercy 162, 180–81 (1988). 
92 Barkow, supra note 19, at 1359–65. One could say something similar about the con-
stricted role for mitigating factors that flow from an emphasis on equality of outcomes. Such 
factors are often based on difficult-to-quantify offender attributes like a poor upbringing, 
good works, family circumstances, and the like. For that reason, the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines clamped down on them in the name of reducing disparity, and some state systems limit 
their relevance to within a specified range. See infra notes 113–16116 and accompanying 
text. Conversely, the many states that continue to use traditional unstructured (indeterminate) 
sentencing leave all of these attributes and substantive values on the table. This approach is 
hospitable to the scholars who reject theorizing, those who embrace eclectic theories of pun-
ishment, and those whose theories require particularistic judgments. The latter category em-
braces not only restorative-justice and therapeutic-jurisprudence enthusiasts, but also virtue 
theorists like Kyron Huigens. See supra note 80. 
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tom-line outcomes. But laymen care about a good deal more. As we 
have argued elsewhere, the criminal justice system once did and could 
again make a point of promoting remorse, apology, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation throughout the criminal process.93 One could say the same 
about treating victims and offenders with dignity and respect at sentenc-
ing, and giving each his day in court. But these considerations operate ex 
post in the context of adjudicating individual cases. They require con-
text-specific judgments of real human beings in all their complexity and 
how the criminal process, and sentencing in particular, affects them. Be-
cause remorse, apologies, and respectful treatment occur after the crime 
and resist reduction to a formula, they appear to jeopardize the link be-
tween crimes and predictable, uniform punishments. They certainly do 
nothing to foster an outcomes-oriented approach to equality. 
Finally, aiming at equalizing outcomes leaves little room for criminal 
justice reform movements like drug courts, therapeutic jurisprudence, 
and restorative justice. Their particularism and emphasis on process, 
qualitative variables, and individual defendants’ needs can produce no-
tably different outcomes for seemingly similar defendants. Some critics 
of drug courts rightly observe that discounting sentences based on de-
fendants’ personal circumstances undercuts equality of drug sentences 
and their general deterrent force.94 But supporters of drug courts hardly 
view that objection as fatal. If the drug-court process of supervision and 
treatment reduces a defendant’s addiction and future dangerousness, his 
greater rehabilitation and lesser need for specific deterrence and inca-
pacitation may justify a lower sentence.95 The two sides talk past each 
 
93 Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice 6–13, 23–27, 159–62 (2012); 
Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 329, 330, 347–
48 (2007); Bibas & Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology, supra note 14, at 109–
48 (2004).  
94 See, e.g., Kevin S. Burke, Just What Made Drug Courts Successful?, 94 Judicature 119, 
123 (2010) (discussing criticisms that drug courts both exacerbate racial disparities and un-
dermine incentives for compliance with drug laws); Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, su-
pra note 87, at 1476–77 (2000) (arguing that drug courts result in a “half-crime approach to 
drug use” that undermines “the legitimate and rational interests of the law enforcement 
community”); Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 87, at 2069 (arguing that 
drug courts wrongly reward “a defendant’s professed attitude adjustment” as opposed to 
“whether the defendant stops using drugs”). 
95 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 94, at 120 (explaining how defendants who successfully 
complete drug court treatment programs may have their sentences waived and their convic-
tions expunged); Fan, supra note 86, at 179–80 (touting drug courts as among the most 
promising decarceration innovations because they give offenders incentives to succeed in 
addiction treatment in order to avoid prison). 
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other, to some extent, as each places different weight on different pur-
poses of punishment. Casting the conversation in the language of equali-
ty of outcomes contributes to that state of affairs, obscuring which pur-
pose of punishment should predominate while tacitly assuming that de-
terrence trumps everything else. 
The same analysis holds true even for data-driven reforms like selec-
tive incapacitation based on clinical or actuarial risk prediction. Risk 
prediction often depends on factors such as education, employment his-
tory, drug use, and age that prove immensely controversial.96 Some of 
the controversy is attributable to disparate racial impacts that correlate 
with the use of these factors, but some of it stems from uneasiness about 
varying sentencing outcomes that has nothing to do with race.97 Despite 
incapacitative arguments for husbanding prison cells for the most dan-
gerous offenders, equality objections to selective incapacitation have 
limited its adoption and popularity.98 But arguments about equality of 
outcomes cannot by themselves explain whether the sentencing varia-
tions of selective incapacitation are good or rather unwarranted. To do 
that, one must answer the prior normative question whether, when it 
comes to sentencing, one should equalize risk management versus other 
arguably legitimate goals (like retribution). And to do that, one must ap-
peal to independent moral, political, and policy considerations—such as 
irrelevance to a legitimate purpose of punishment, or impermissible use 
of unconstitutional sentencing considerations, or disproportionate impact 
on minority populations that have been disadvantaged from the get-go—
instead of equality of outcomes itself. The most forceful and persuasive 
 
96 See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 671, 687–90 (2015) 
(reviewing basics of clinical and actual risk-assessment tools in sentencing). 
97 See, e.g., id. at 693–718 (discussing equality and fairness objections to risk-based sen-
tencing); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 803, 817–42 (2014) (detailing criticisms of evidence-based 
sentencing, including various equality-based concerns); Devin Barrett, Holder Cautions on 
Risk of Bias in Big Data Use in Criminal Justice, Wall St. J. (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-attorney-general-cautions-on-risk-of-bias-in-big-data-use-
in-criminal-justice-1406916606 (warning that risk-based sentencing can “exacerbate unwar-
ranted and unjust disparities”). 
98 See Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 Va. 
J. Crim. L. 1, 117 (2012) (discussing tension between selective incapacitation and equality); 
Alex R. Piquero et al., The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 Crime & Just. 359, 381 (2003) 
(same). 
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equality arguments against selective incapacitation, like those of Sonja 
Starr, do just that.99 
That does not mean that equalizing sentencing outcomes is necessari-
ly misguided. If one emphasizes general deterrence (like Beccaria), gen-
eral incapacitation, or retribution limited to the criminal act or harm, 
equalizing outcomes may follow naturally. It does mean, however, that 
sentencing needs to focus more on why we punish in order to figure out 
what to equalize and how vigorously to do so. How we operationalize 
equality in sentencing, in other words, should be subservient to exoge-
nous moral and policy considerations. From the standpoint of the crimi-
nal law, one’s substantive philosophy of punishment ordinarily would 
first establish what factors justify punishment, and to what extent. Those 
factors would specify which factors make cases alike along the relevant 
dimensions for purposes of ensuring equality. But with equality of out-
comes as a baseline, the causal arrow appears, at least sometimes, to be 
reversed, letting equality dictate punishment philosophy rather than the 
other way around.100 
That dynamic also underscores an important point about the tired 
equality-versus-individualization framework that too often falls by the 
wayside in criminal law and sentencing literature. To an extent, that de-
bate in sentencing is a false dichotomy. Everyone agrees that the right 
factors need to be equalized and the wrong ones excluded. But people 
have a harder time agreeing which factors are irrelevant and how best to 
operationalize their views. If we could achieve perfect agreement on fac-
tors and could perfectly operationalize our consensus, then much of the 
equality-versus-individualization debate would fall away. If all punish-
ments were perfectly individualized for all offenders, then no offender 
would be punished unequally vis-à-vis any other, at least in terms of 
outcomes. 
 
99 See Starr, supra note 97, at 817–42; Sonja B. Starr, Op. Ed., Sentencing, by the Num-
bers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2014, at A17.  
100 One could maintain that the causal arrow should run in this direction—that is, that 
equality should dictate which punishment philosophies should be on the table, and that pun-
ishment philosophy should be subservient to exogenous equality considerations. Even that, 
however, does not get around the problem that one cannot determine how equality of out-
comes should drive punishment philosophy without recourse to some foundational theory 
that provides guidance as to what makes cases relevantly alike or different for purposes of 
comparing outcomes. That theory need not be rooted in punishment philosophy, but it does 
need to exist. 
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When scholars and policy makers debate sentencing disparities 
against that backdrop, then, more is happening than meets the eye. Some 
of that debate implicates disagreements on how best to implement 
agreed-upon substantive approaches to sentencing. But much of it impli-
cates underlying dissensus on questions of substance and, relatedly, the 
procedural and institutional structures that channel who resolves those 
questions and how. When we criticize disparate sentencing outcomes, 
what we often are criticizing is the reliance on the wrong or irrelevant 
factors, as well as the institutional arrangements that allow those factors 
to hold sway. In evaluating equality of outcomes in sentencing, it is thus 
critical to pay attention not just to substantive considerations. We must 
also focus on the institutional arrangements that drive sentencing varia-
tions and, as with underlying substantive concerns, the light they might 
cast on the normative status of any disparities they create. The next Part 
takes up that task. 
II. EQUAL OUTCOMES AND THE STRUCTURE OF SENTENCING 
Just as a focus on equal outcomes can obscure issues of substance in 
sentencing, it also can obscure issues of institutional design: whose 
views should inform sentencing and how. This Part explores how an 
outcomes-based approach to sentencing equality tilts the institutional 
landscape of sentencing in ways that sit uneasily with other core princi-
ples of sentencing design. Section II.A looks at how a focus on equaliz-
ing outcomes leads to centripetal as opposed to centrifugal sentencing. It 
pushes sentencing power in to the center and up to higher levels of au-
thority, leaving little room for the disaggregated and lower-level institu-
tions that have long been seen as essential to just punishment. Section 
II.B explores how that oft-overlooked centralizing effect on sentencing 
stands in tension with principles of checks and balances and federalism. 
Those principles and the values underlying them have particular force in 
the context of sentencing, where a level of localism, pluralism, and 
communalism is practically built into our constitutional framework. That 
structural overlay complicates the picture for an approach to sentencing 
equality that aims at harmonizing outcomes, and brings normative nu-
ance to aspects of sentencing variation that are commonly lumped to-
gether under the undifferentiated rubric of disparity. 
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A. Centripetal versus Centrifugal Sentencing 
Equality of outcomes, by crowding out granular, ex post, and softer 
sentencing values in favor of more neutral, easily quantifiable metrics, 
also has institutional effects. When equality excludes the former in favor 
of the latter, it crowds out the institutional players that, in practice, are 
largely inseparable from them. In doing so, it privileges a centralized, 
often bureaucratic approach to sentencing over more decentralized and 
bottom-up approaches. 
To see this, return for a moment to the equal-punishment versus indi-
vidualized-punishment framework. As operationalized on the ground, 
individualized sentencing is typically disaggregated sentencing.101 Clas-
sic sentencing decisions like Woodson v. North Carolina102 and, more 
recently, Miller v. Alabama103 reflect that notion. Both struck down 
mandatory sentencing statutes in light of the Eighth Amendment’s con-
stitutional imperative to ensure that the harshest penalties (death in 
Woodson, and life without parole for juveniles in Miller) are imposed 
only after contextualized, individualized assessments of blame.104 In do-
ing so, both shifted sentencing authority from legislatures to disaggre-
gated groups of lower-level decision makers, including trial court judges 
and (ultimately, in capital cases) sentencing juries.105 They also both di-
rected sentencers to consider a wider range of sentencing factors and 
values—including, in capital cases, “any aspect of a defendant’s charac-
ter or record”106—than those that mandatory-punishment statutes took 
into account.107 More granular sentencing goals and values resist easy 
codification and weighting, and different disaggregated actors with dif-
fering perspectives might approach and apply them differently. Hence 
those actors might well reach different dispositions across objectively 
alike cases.108 The result is disparity, or inequality of outcomes, in sen-
tencing. 
 
101 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1675 (noting that “discretionary regimes 
frequently rely on disaggregated decisionmaking”).  
102 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
103 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
104 Id. at 2469; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion). 
105 Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1745, 1770–71 
(2012) (discussing the individualization principle of cases). 
106 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
107 Bierschbach, supra note 105, at 1767–70. 
108 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1675–76; see also Gerken, Second-Order 
Diversity, supra note 17, at 1139 (discussing jury verdicts). 
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An outcomes-based approach to sentencing equality will be suspi-
cious of such a disaggregated and devolved decision-making structure. 
To combat disparity, it will seek to centralize sentencing, pushing au-
thority inward and upward to bodies like legislatures and sentencing 
commissions. That is, in fact, how states responded to Furman v. Geor-
gia’s directive to eliminate arbitrariness, or unwarranted disparities, in 
sentencing.109 Some state legislatures enacted mandatory or otherwise 
rigid capital punishment statutes that left little authority to lower-level 
sentencers, until Woodson and its progeny later held them unconstitu-
tional.110 That was also the modus operandi of the sentencing-reform 
movement that began in the 1970s and culminated in the widespread 
adoption of structured sentencing over the next few decades. Those sys-
tems often relied on centralized sentencing commissions to develop 
comprehensive guidelines to cabin and channel sentencing discretion.111 
Guidelines vary considerably among jurisdictions, so making blanket 
pronouncements about them can be hazardous business. But generally, 
the more guidelines sought to equalize outcomes and minimize dispari-
ties, the more detailed and restrictive they were. Some guidelines sys-
tems, most notoriously, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, were ex-
traordinarily rigid, seeking to eliminate most disparities by eliminating 
possible differences of approach among the disaggregated judges who 
applied them.112 The Federal Sentencing Commission emphasized “uni-
formity in sentencing . . . for similar criminal offenses committed by 
similar offenders.”113 It defined similarity largely in terms of easily 
quantifiable factors that could be applied mechanistically, like the 
charges of conviction, drug amounts, and the offenders’ rap sheets. It 
minimized the importance of more qualitative “offender characteristics” 
like youth, mental or emotional condition, and family or community 
 
109 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).  
110 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (constitutionalizing a requirement of textured and granular 
sentencing in capital cases); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (same); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation 
of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 361–64, 375–78 (1995) (tracing the evolution 
of Eighth Amendment capital sentencing requirements aimed at promoting consistency). 
111 See Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times: A Comparative Perspective 6–8 (Mi-
chael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997) (describing the movement in the United States 
away from indeterminate sentencing regimes and toward guideline-based systems, which 
yielded sentencing commissions in nearly twenty-five jurisdictions by 1996). 
112 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 36, at 51 (noting that “the overriding statutory directive” 
imposed upon the U.S. Sentencing Commission was to “eliminate ‘unwanted disparity’”). 
113 U.S.S.G.M., supra note 61, § 1A1.3 (emphasis added).  
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ties.114 That left sentencing judges very little room to contextualize sen-
tences, leading to widespread criticism about the same kind of “false 
consistency” created by mandatory sentencing statutes.115 
Other approaches, like those of Wisconsin or Kansas, gave front-line 
sentencers more leeway, either by making guidelines voluntary or by au-
thorizing departures from presumed sentencing ranges on numerous 
grounds.116 That approach leaves more wiggle room for variations, both 
good and bad, across cases. Whether one approach is better is beside the 
point. The point is that efforts to guarantee equality of outcomes corre-
late with centralized, monistic sentencing structures. 
That centralization tamps down on variation in outcomes that may 
otherwise naturally result from the structures and processes of democrat-
ic self-government. Determining punishment is a deeply communal and 
moral act, one that implicates a wide range of values along with multi-
farious and competing purposes of punishment.117 Different actors will 
apply and reconcile those values differently depending on their institu-
tional perspectives, the level of government at which they operate, their 
community’s particular norms, and so forth. As many of the Court’s sen-
tencing decisions acknowledge, sentencing thus requires and benefits 
from a range of judgments: some expert, some lay; some at a high level 
of abstraction, some more concrete; and some early in the process, some 
late.118 As those cases further illustrate, sentencing thus intersects with 
 
114 See id. § 1B1.1(a)(1), (6); id. § 1B1.2(a); id. ch. 4, pt. A; Douglas A. Berman, Distin-
guishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 
Stan. L. Rev. 277, 281–85 (2005) (“The new sentencing philosophies and goals reflected in 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory sentencing statutes have emphasized of-
fense conduct at sentencing and have limited judges’ opportunity to consider offender char-
acteristics.”). 
115 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982); see Stith & Cabranes, supra note 36, 
at 95–97, 104–06; Tonry, supra note 7, at 72–89. 
116 See Nora V. Demleitner et al., Sentencing Law and Policy 152–54 (3d ed. 2013) 
(providing an overview of state guidelines systems and discussing Kansas approach); Neal 
B. Kauder & Brian J. Ostrom, State Sentencing Guidelines: Profiles and Continuum 12, 27 
(2008) (discussing sentencing guidelines in Kansas and Wisconsin). 
117 See Bierschbach & Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, supra note 14, at 
427–29; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 
401 (1958) (arguing that because criminal justice pursues a wide array of competing values 
and objectives, none of which wholly exclude the others, criminal law choices demand “mul-
tivalued rather than . . . single-valued thinking”). 
118 See Bierschbach & Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, supra note 14, at 
430–34; see also Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sen-
tencing, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 20–24 (2012) [hereinafter Bierschbach & Bibas, Notice-and-
Comment Sentencing] (noting similar inputs in the agency context); Hart, supra note 117, at 
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other constitutional principles of institutional design, such as checks and 
balances and federalism, that routinely play central roles in other public 
law fields. The next section turns to that intersection and explores what 
it means for sentencing equality’s outcomes-focused approach. 
B. Horizontal and Vertical Sentencing 
The interaction of sentencing equality with structural constitutional 
principles like checks and balances and federalism is rich, complex, and 
understudied.119 This Section explores those interactions along two dif-
ferent axes of sentencing design: horizontal, by which we mean how 
sentencing power is divided among all of the different actors who have 
(or could have) input into sentencing decisions; and vertical, by which 
we mean how sentencing power is divided among different levels of 
governance, from national or state down to local and neighborhood. 
Along each axis, we show how these principles and the values underly-
ing them have special force in the sentencing context, intersecting with 
its pluralist and localist dimensions in ways that complicate an out-
comes-oriented conception of sentencing equality.120 
1. Horizontal Design: Checks and Balances 
Real-world sentencing involves a host of institutional actors across 
each branch of government, each of which has its own unique compe-
tencies. Some, like legislatures, sentencing commissions, and (perhaps 
to a lesser extent) appellate courts, are well-suited for bringing an ex 
ante, high-level, centralized perspective to bear on questions of punish-
ment. Legislatures can rank categories of crimes and group broadly alike 
cases alike. In theory, as Jenia Iontcheva Turner states, they are also the 
best body for “mak[ing] difficult choices among opposing moral and 
 
402 (noting that the value trade-offs inherent in criminal justice “do not present them-
selves . . . in an institutional vacuum,” and that criminal justice must thus incorporate a com-
plex of institutions and institutional ends). 
119 See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 802, 840 (2015) (noting that “criminal law scholarship in general has paid 
relatively little attention to core structural constitutional checks and their relationship to 
criminal law administration”). 
120 To be clear, we do not claim that the Constitution requires particular sentencing institu-
tions; we are not, for instance, making an argument for or against putting Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), on steroids. Our more modest claim is that centripetal sentenc-
ing is in tension with vertical and horizontal dimensions of sentencing that are both constitu-
tionally and normatively important to sentencing’s institutional structure. 
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ideological viewpoints” on punishment,121 although in reality they often 
gloss over such issues. Sentencing commissions can in theory do the 
same, as well as establish more detailed guidance, gather and track data, 
and generate resource-impact assessments on the costs of various sen-
tencing options.122 Appellate judges’ birds-eye perspective allows them 
to spot differences in treatment that might not be seen by front-line sen-
tencers with narrower fields of view. 
Other actors are better suited to making individualized, ex post, gran-
ular judgments. Juries and sentencing judges (when not hemmed in by 
restrictive statutes and guidelines) fall into this category. So too do pro-
bation officers, parole boards, and upstream actors like prosecutors, who 
have huge influence over sentencing through deciding what crimes to 
charge and what plea bargains to strike. From the standpoint of separa-
tion of powers, each has its own sphere of competence and authority. 
Ideally, each exercises discretion to contextualize sentencing by weigh-
ing competing values from its own unique perspective.123 
But like legislatures and sentencing commissions, each also has its 
own limitations. Juries more than any other actor reflect and embody 
community values. But their lack of training and experience might make 
them more prone to certain biases and less situationally aware of how a 
punishment fits within the larger sentencing framework.124 Judges might 
be more situationally aware but also more “overconditioned” and ac-
cordingly less appreciative of complexities and moral nuances.125 Parole 
boards, probation officers, and even governors (through clemency) are 
well-positioned to evaluate personal growth and moral reform. But they 
 
121 Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 Va. L. Rev. 311, 350 
(2003). 
122 See Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States Sentencing Commission Miss?, 101 
Yale L.J. 1773, 1786 (1992) (discussing the sentencing commissions’ use of resource-impact 
statements to help craft guidelines intended to “distribut[e] punishment under conditions of 
scarcity”). 
123 See Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 20, at 35–39; Rachel E. Barkow, Separa-
tion of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1053–54 (2006) [hereinafter 
Barkow, Separation of Powers]; Bierschbach & Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punish-
ment, supra note 14, at 413–15. 
124 Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 20, at 74 (“It is of course possible that the jury 
might exercise this discretionary power in undesirable ways, that ‘the wishes and feelings of 
the community’ might be the kind of popular prejudice that is troubling.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Iontcheva, supra note 121, at 354 (acknowledging that jury sentencing is criticized on 
grounds that “juries’ lack of expertise and experience result in disparate and systematically 
biased sentences and heavy financial burdens on the judicial system”). 
125 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); see Iontcheva, supra note 121, at 353. 
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too can be overconditioned and risk-averse, succumbing to incentives to 
avoid any danger of recidivism instead of taking a chance on a deserving 
individual.126 Prosecutors have the perspective and power to balance in-
dividual blameworthiness against systemic demands. But their decisions 
often turn on legalistic habits of charging and plea bargaining that are 
exacerbated by incentives to clear cases quickly.127 
Moreover, left to its own devices, each of these institutions is also 
prone to generating disparities in sentencing outcomes between seem-
ingly alike offenders, raising concerns about arbitrariness or bias. Like 
other institutions that implement policy through myriad disaggregated, 
low-level discretionary decisions (think, for example, of police officers), 
each is suspect in equality terms. One could, for that reason, narrowly 
restrict these actors and privilege legislatures, sentencing commissions, 
and other centralized sentencing institutions. But that would sit uneasily 
with the notion that each of these actors nevertheless has something 
unique and necessary to contribute. It also would sit uneasily with the 
even more fundamental constitutional notion that centralized, unchecked 
power is dangerous, in sentencing as elsewhere.128 
The Court’s sentencing case law reflects this. Though it acknowledg-
es the value of equality at sentencing, the Court’s sentencing cases do 
not embrace a simple institutional arrangement. Instead, the Constitution 
relies upon checks and balances to give content to the notion of just pun-
ishment. Over the last four decades, the Court has repeatedly intervened 
whenever one sentencing institution has arrogated too much power to 
itself or pushed sentencing toward an aggregated and homogenized cen-
 
126 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010) (treating review by parole board as crit-
ical to adequately considering juveniles’ potential for growth, maturity, and personal trans-
formation); W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 
395, 397–98 (2011) (discussing incentives of parole boards to avoid any risk whatsoever in 
making release decisions). 
127 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1701–02. Further complicating matters, head 
prosecutors as well as many judges are elected, which may make them risk-averse and too 
sensitive to transient waves of popular opinion. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor 
Elections Fail Us, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 581, 597–606 (2009) (discussing campaign pres-
sures facing prosecutors). 
128 See Thomas Lundmark, Power & Rights in U.S. Constitutional Law 93 (2d ed. 2008) 
(“[F]or federal structures like the one in the United States . . . [t]he most frequent justifica-
tion is roughly the same as the policy underlying the principle of separation of powers: divi-
sion of the monopoly on governmental powers to avoid tyranny, caprice, and oppression.”). 
As Rachel Barkow notes, “the Constitution’s separation of powers takes on greater signifi-
cance in the criminal context because it provides the only effective check on systemic gov-
ernment overreaching.” Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 123, at 1053. 
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ter, whether in the name of reducing disparities or otherwise. The Wood-
son/Lockett/Eddings trilogy and Miller are examples.129 So too is Gra-
ham v. Florida, which fragmented sentencing power by spreading out 
sentencing discretion horizontally and temporally, from judges and 
prosecutors at the front end of sentencing to parole boards at the back 
end.130 The Court’s watershed decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey revi-
talized juries as a powerful check on the sentencing authority of legisla-
tures, prosecutors, and judges.131 Post-Apprendi decisions like Blakely v. 
Washington,132 United States v. Booker,133 Rita v. United States,134 and 
Kimbrough v. United States135 further diffused power. They invalidated 
binding guidelines, freed sentencing judges to consider a wider range of 
factors and policy considerations through reasoned variances at sentenc-
ing, and prompted more give-and-take among sentencing judges, appel-
late courts, and sentencing commissions.136 
These interventions have rested on varied interpretive and constitu-
tional grounds—formalism and functionalism, the Sixth Amendment 
and the Eighth. Because of that, commentators do not view them togeth-
er, lumping cases like Graham and Miller into the doctrinal box of pro-
portionality while separately treating Apprendi and its ilk as an unrelated 
line of right-to-jury cases. But collectively they embody an elementary 
principle of institutional design for sentencing: No one institutional 
player should hold all the cards. A multiplicity of inputs is required both 
 
129 Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104 (1982); Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455; see supra notes 102–07, 110 and accompany-
ing text.  
130 Graham, 560 U.S. at 81–82 (prohibiting sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole); see Bierschbach, supra note 105, at 1779–81 
(describing how Graham shifted authority from front-end to back-end sentencers). 
131 530 U.S. 466, 494, 497 (2000) (emphasizing the jury’s role in authorizing a particular 
maximum punishment in a particular case by its guilty verdict); Stuntz, The Collapse of 
American Criminal Justice, supra note 15, at 30, 304 (discussing the jury’s checking role); 
Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 Ind. L.J. 731, 750–68 (2010) (same). 
132 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
133 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
134 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
135 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
136 See id. at 111; Rita, 551 U.S. at 354–55; Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–65; Blakely, 542 U.S. 
at 304–05; see also Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1247–50 (2011) (permitting 
district courts to consider evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation at resentencing); Amy 
Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1631, 1667–81 (2012) (ex-
plaining how Booker and its progeny have fostered interbranch dialogue on federal sentenc-
ing policy, “permitting the courts to communicate with the Commission (and with each oth-
er) in a transparent and effective manner”). 
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to give content to the notion of just punishment, with its competing pur-
poses, values, and tradeoffs, and to guard against unfair or otherwise un-
desirable decisions by any one actor.137 An outcomes-focused concep-
tion of equality bent on centralizing sentencing and reducing discretion 
is in tension with this checks-and-balances approach. 
2. Vertical Design: Federalism and Localism 
The centralization that results from striving to equalize outcomes is 
also in tension with federalism values that inhere in sentencing’s dis-
aggregated structure. Federalism, for all of its relevance to institutional 
design, is not much discussed in contemporary sentencing scholarship.138 
When it is, it usually is in the context of Eighth Amendment proportion-
ality jurisprudence. Debates revolve around how and when the Constitu-
tion should limit states’ democratic processes when it comes to authoriz-
ing capital and other serious punishments for certain crimes.139 
 
137 See Bierschbach & Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, supra note 14, at 
398–401, 405–16, 423–36 (discussing constitutional principles of institutional design inher-
ent in Court’s sentencing decisions); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1724 (arguing 
that criminal justice could be conceived “as a gauntlet of independently functioning switch-
es,” and that “[t]he suspect who runs the . . . gauntlet and finds himself convicted and pun-
ished is likely to be the kind of person for whom conviction and punishment is normatively 
appropriate”); cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted . . . not to promote efficiency but to 
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”). Conversely, efforts to homogenize sentences by 
centralizing power can backfire, as when mandatory-minimum sentencing laws give prose-
cutors unchecked power to charge-bargain away those supposedly uniform sentences.  
138 For some (comparatively rare) examples of discussions, see Michael M. O’Hear, Na-
tional Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Feder-
al-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 721, 723–25 (2002); and Rachel E. Barkow, 
Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1276, 1278 (2005). For ex-
amples of criminal justice federalism articles beyond the sentencing context, see Doron 
Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional 
Competition, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1831, 1832 (2005); Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federal-
ism in an Age of Criminal Justice Interconnectedness, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 257, 258–60 
(2005); Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. Health 
Care L. & Pol’y 5, 8 (2013); and Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal En-
forcement Power, 123 Yale L.J. 2236, 2239 (2014). 
139 See, e.g., Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, 
Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 70–75 
(2010); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 Iowa 
L. Rev. 69, 87–90 (2012); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 101 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Court intrudes upon areas that the Constitution reserves to other (state and federal) organs of 
government. . . . [T]he Eighth Amendment leaves the unavoidably moral question of who 
‘deserves’ a particular nonprohibited method of punishment to the judgment of the legisla-
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Such debates epitomize the conventional approach to federalism dis-
course, which emphasizes the political lines of sovereignty in terms of 
national power versus state autonomy.140 The history of those debates 
when it comes to equality, broadly conceived, has not always been pret-
ty. Federalism, so understood, has often been invoked to shield discrim-
inatory state action from national interference. That helps to explain 
why, insofar as equality in sentencing implicates race, local criminal jus-
tice variation is presumptively suspect. Equality arguments pressed back 
against that history, pushing power inward and upward to the federal 
government in the service of national norms. That federal-state tug-of-
war is in keeping with how the Warren Court expanded incorporation 
doctrine to reform criminal procedure over the federalist objections of 
the states.141 
But that is neither the tension nor the aspect of federalism that we 
have in mind. The dimension of federalism to which we refer goes be-
yond states to encompass the local and sublocal sites on the front lines 
of governance. It shares much in common with what Heather Gerken 
calls “federalism all the way down,”142 but one also could call it “norma-
tive” or “localist” federalism, or perhaps even simply “localism.”143 We 
acknowledge that none of these theories is exactly like the others, and 
we do not mean to play too fast and loose with labels.144 Nor do we 
 
tures that authorize the penalty . . . .”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321–24 (2002) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s method was “antithetical to consid-
erations of federalism”). 
140 See Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 17, at 11–21 (discussing ongo-
ing influence of the “sovereignty” account of federalism). 
141 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (incorporating Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination into Fourteenth Amendment’s protections against the states); 
see generally Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 2.6(b)–(d), at 70–75 (5th ed. 
2009) (discussing selective incorporation of criminal procedure protections and correspond-
ing federalism concerns). 
142 Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 17, at 8. 
143 Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Con-
temporary Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1317 (1994). 
144 “Federalism all the way down,” for instance, focuses on the way in which the localist 
dimensions of federalism can enhance and bolster national ends. See Gerken, Federalism All 
the Way Down, supra note 17, at 22. “Normative federalism” focuses on the way in which 
the values of federalism can be enhanced by devolving power beyond states to the local lev-
el. See Briffault, supra note 143, at 1316–17. Localism also seeks to devolve power to the 
local level, but it is less concerned with advancing federalism values in doing so. Localism, 
with its preference for local over state power, can in fact come into conflict with a conven-
tional federalism, which favors strengthening the autonomy of the states vis-à-vis the nation-
al government. See id. 
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mean to defend or debate any one of these theories from the ground up. 
Scholars like Gerken, Richard Briffault, and many others have done and 
still do so extensively. For our purposes here, it suffices to note that all 
of these accounts focus on how localized actors well below the state lev-
el serve to further federalism’s underlying values. These local actors in-
clude not just cities but zoning commissions, school boards, municipal 
court judges, homeowners’ associations, business improvement districts, 
and a host of other discrete, special-purpose institutions. They serve 
goals of federalism that include checking tyranny, promoting political 
participation, reflecting diversity, improving government responsive-
ness, and advancing innovation and experimentation.145 
Gerken and others have shown how devolution and disaggregated de-
cision making common to low-level institutions serve these and related 
goals. Much of that scholarship limits itself to classic issues of local 
government law (like the constitutional place of municipalities within 
our federal structure146) or to discrete policy-making areas outside of 
criminal justice (like environmental law or securities regulation147). But 
not all of it does. Gerken herself, for instance, extensively discusses ju-
ries, explaining how, collectively, they function as a “tool for aggrega-
tion—of community judgments, interpretations of the law, whatever 
democratic judgments we think juries render—when we cannot all sit at 
the same table to hash out such questions.”148 Juries enhance citizens’ 
participatory experiences and increase incentives for those with oppos-
ing viewpoints to listen to each other. And they act as a vital means of 
achieving “second-order diversity,” infusing decisions with minority 
views that might have lost out at the ballot box and teeing up issues for 
larger state or national debate.149 Ethan Leib brings a localist perspective 
to the field of statutory interpretation. He argues that locally elected 
judges interpreting state statutes appropriately give a “local flavor” to 
 
145 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Briffault, supra note 143, at 1312. 
146 See, e.g., David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Con-
stitution, 115 Yale L.J. 2218, 2220 (2006); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Fed-
eral-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 961 (2007). 
147 See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case 
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1796, 1796 
(2008); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 
1099 (2009); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securi-
ties Enforcement, 11 Conn. Ins. L.J. 107, 109 (2005). 
148 Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 17, at 1138. 
149 See id. at 1126–28.  
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those statutes, reflective of “local courts’ sense of local norms and the 
interests of the local population.”150 That is especially so, he claims, 
when dealing with “[c]ontentious issues” that “may be susceptible to di-
verse interpretations.”151 And within criminal justice, as Richard 
Schragger writes, discussions of policing strategies (from broken-
windows to community policing) have long invoked localist arguments 
about the “specific needs of unique communities” and the ability of 
“[n]eighborhood-level governments [to] tailor their policies and allocate 
resources more efficiently than can larger governments.”152 Those argu-
ments are premised in part, he notes, on the notion that local communi-
ties provide a space in which individuals can arrive at shared values by 
engaging in negotiation over collective norms.153 
Sentencing has so far flown below the radar of these debates. That it 
has done so is somewhat strange. In practice, individualized and dis-
aggregated sentencing decisions are also by and large localized sentenc-
ing decisions. The judges, juries, prosecutors, and other criminal justice 
actors who determine punishment are often locally elected or otherwise 
cognizant of local interests. Yet contemporary sentencing scholars have 
failed to draw the connection, even though the individualization-versus-
equality framework still colors much thinking in the field. Scholars typi-
cally do not view sentencing as analogous to other areas of regulation or 
governance (think land use or environmental law) that occupy federal-
ism and local-government-law scholars.154 Instead, they often approach 
it as pure theory, turning on claims about the ends and purposes of pun-
ishment that are removed from structural questions. 
The assumption in all of this is that punishment should not turn on lo-
cal views. It should not, as observers sometimes put it, depend on the 
 
150 Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 897, 919, 925 
(2013).  
151 Id. at 927. 
152 Schragger, supra note 18, at 381; see, e.g., Meares & Kahan, supra note 18, at 198 (ar-
guing that the Warren Court’s top-down, judicially enforced individual rights approach to 
criminal procedure has outlived its usefulness and is impeding reform in an era of greater 
minority enfranchisement and new approaches to community policing). 
153 Schragger, supra note 18, at 398–99. 
154 David Ball’s excellent work on the relationship between local criminal justice and the 
use of state prisons is a notable exception. See W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (On the 
State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration 
Rates—and Why It Should, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 987, 990–91 (2012); Ball, Why State Pris-
ons?, supra note 12, at 78.  
COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
1488 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 102:1447 
fortuity of where one happens to commit a crime.155 Once one moves 
past sentencing disparities based on impermissible factors like race, 
many other sentencing disparities about which scholars complain—such 
as those between different counties or prosecutorial districts in the same 
state or between sentences imposed by individual judges—are stuck in 
what Gerken characterizes as a sovereignty model of federalism.156 That 
model views the political lines of states (and, to a lesser extent, cities) as 
the only lines that count. That is why, while intrastate sentencing dispar-
ities are frequently criticized on equality grounds, interstate disparities—
say, one state taking a completely different approach to sentencing drug 
dealers than a neighboring state—rarely are. 
The picture is more complicated when one looks beyond the sover-
eignty model to see the sources of those disparities as sources of local-
ized power. Think again of sentencing judges, juries, prosecutors, proba-
tion officers, and the like. Disaggregating sentencing through such ac-
tors furthers many of the federalism values that scholars have touted 
outside the sentencing context. It makes sentencing flexible and respon-
sive, letting front-line sentencers tailor punishments based on circum-
stances unique to the offender’s and community’s needs, much as drug 
and other problem-solving courts aim to do.157 It is diverse, as juries, 
judges, prosecutors, and other locally embedded actors infuse sentencing 
determinations with local values that might vary from one place to an-
 
155 See Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Feder-
al Guidelines, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 85, 100 (2005) (citing Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar 
Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge’s Perspective, 30 
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1027, 1028 (1999)). 
156 Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 17, at 11–21 (discussing “ghost of 
sovereignty” in contemporary federalism scholarship (capitalization omitted)).   
157 Variations in outcomes have long been seen as a virtue of such “democratic experimen-
talist” approaches to law, which allow locally tailored solutions to legal issues to emerge 
from the bottom up, with the hope that successful approaches can then be taken and adapted 
to other communities’ needs as circumstances dictate. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sa-
bel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 401–02 (1998) 
(describing how drug court judges evaluate a wealth of information to determine “whether 
and how treatment may be more appropriate than prison”); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. 
Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 
831, 832 (2000) [hereinafter Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts] (describing how drug 
court judges closely monitor defendants’ performance in treatment programs, which are se-
lected by assessing their needs and possibilities); see also Greg Berman, What Is a Tradi-
tional Judge Anyway? Problem Solving in the State Courts, 84 Judicature 78, 78 (2000) (ex-
plaining that problem-solving courts “seek to use the authority of courts to address the un-
derlying problems of individual litigants, the structural problems of the justice system, and 
the social problems of communities”). 
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other.158 It reinforces social solidarity, evaluating wrongs in order to un-
derscore in the community’s mind what is right and what is blamewor-
thy.159 It is participatory, requiring citizens and criminal justice institu-
tions to engage with the realities of cases. That up-close engagement 
shapes judgments concerning desert and other punishment issues, as 
Paul Robinson and his coauthors have shown.160 It also provides a useful 
feedback loop, leaving room for dissent, difference, and pluralistic ap-
proaches to hashing out difficult issues of punishment. At the same time, 
it aggregates community judgments at higher levels and generates in-
formation and dialogue that can foster innovation and reform.161 One 
might even argue that the arguments and observations of Gerken, Leib, 
and Schragger should have special purchase at sentencing, with its lack 
of easy policy answers, difficult moral tradeoffs, and inextricable con-
nection to community norms. 
These themes, too, appear in the Court’s sentencing cases. Dissenting 
in Blakely, Justice Kennedy stressed the importance of “recurring dia-
logue” between different levels of government acting as “laboratories 
 
158 See Leib, supra note 150, at 908–09 (discussing local judges’ consideration of local 
needs and issues at sentencing). While that is most true in state systems, with their locally 
elected officials, it is even true to some degree in the federal system. See Rachel E. Barkow, 
Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 
519, 526 (2011) (“U.S. [A]ttorneys . . . are more responsive to local interests” than the U.S. 
Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. because “[t]hey are typically drawn from the dis-
trict in which they serve, and they necessarily pay attention to the local values and practic-
es . . . . U.S. [A]ttorneys and federal judges in a district are also more likely than Main Jus-
tice to take into account the attitudes and values of local juries . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
159 Reinforcing social solidarity, according to Emile Durkheim, is perhaps the central mis-
sion of criminal justice. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 60–64 (W.D. 
Halls trans., The Free Press 1984) (1893); see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social 
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349, 363–66 (1997) (discussing criminal law’s re-
lationship to social meaning and social norms). 
160 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 77, at 57–66 (explaining how intuitions about pun-
ishment might change when individuals attempt to fit new factual scenarios into existing be-
lief structures); Robinson et al., supra note 77, at 815–25 (showing how exposure to the par-
ticular factual details of a case, including “extralegal punishment factors,” influences intui-
tions about punishment); cf. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 17, at 32 
(observing that “[j]uries’ decisions . . . give us a more fine-grained read on where the People 
stand” than do legislatures’, as “[l]egislatures make law at some distance from individual 
cases,” whereas juries do in the context of real-life victims and defendants, “unmediated by 
political parties or electoral politics”). 
161 David Ball discusses similar “process” benefits—including transparency, sincerity, ex-
perimentation, and comportment with Sixth Amendment values—that would flow from forc-
ing local governments as opposed to state governments to shoulder the costs of prison usage. 
See Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 12, at 109–14. 
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for innovation and experiment[ation]” in sentencing.162 The tie between 
localism and sentencing is clearest in the Court’s jury cases, with their 
emphasis on the jury’s prerogatives to check overzealous government 
officials and give content to community values.163 Justices Stevens and 
Breyer have even argued that the Eighth Amendment requires jury sen-
tencing in capital cases precisely because of the jury’s ability to safe-
guard against the imposition of morally inappropriate sentences by 
bringing community norms to bear.164 But if the jury’s ability to apply 
community standards is to have any actual meaning, juries must be able 
to vary in applying statewide capital statutes, no matter how much we 
try to guide jury discretion. Justice Breyer acknowledged as much in 
Ring v. Arizona.165 The diversity of views among American communities 
on capital punishment, he emphasized, “argues strongly for procedures 
that will help assure that, in a particular case, the community indeed be-
lieves application of the death penalty is appropriate.”166 Yet that same 
diversity of opinion also creates disparity in outcomes, which is a major 
criticism of juries both inside and outside of criminal justice.167 
This constitutional overlay to localism in sentencing sets it apart from 
other areas of criminal justice as one where attention to localist values is 
especially important. One could, after all, extend many of the points 
above to argue for more devolution in other areas of criminal justice, in-
cluding procedural rights or substantive crime-definition. Whether and 
how much to do so is beyond the scope of this Article, although we 
briefly flag some scholars’ movements in those directions below.168 But 
when it comes to sentencing, the notion of disaggregated decision mak-
ing and some degree of normative variation at the local level is practical-
 
162 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
163 See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text (discussing the Apprendi line of cases). 
164 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613–19 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515–26 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. 
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467–90 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
165 536 U.S. 584.  
166 Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that “[m]any communities 
may have accepted some or all” arguments against the death penalty and that “more than 
two-thirds of American counties have never imposed the death penalty since Gregg [v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)]”).  
167 Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 17, at 1165. 
168 See infra notes 178–79 and accompanying text (discussing community policing), 180–
81 and accompanying text (discussing City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), and 
procedural constitutional rights), and 182 (discussing municipal criminal codes). 
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ly baked into our constitutional framework—in the corpus of decisions 
and principles discussed above, and in more workaday constitutional 
rules like the Sixth Amendment rights to local venue and a jury based on 
a fair cross-section of the community.169 
We do not want to overstate the case or to paint too rosy a picture of 
the federalist and localist dimensions of sentencing. Not all of the insti-
tutions that have a hand in sentencing reliably work well to channel local 
values. Prosecutors sometimes succumb to their own incentives or pro-
fessional tunnel vision. Judicial elections can foster a tough-on-crime 
approach based on a sensationalist case. “Community” views might be 
badly fractured or, worse, reflect privileged over disadvantaged voic-
es.170 Feedback loops do little good unless sentencers offer reasoned ex-
planations for what they are doing and why, and others actually take 
note. Our aim is not to defend a robustly localist approach to sentencing, 
let alone to argue that it is somehow constitutionally compelled. Rather, 
we simply want to suggest that we need at least as compelling justifica-
tions to write off the benefits of local variation at sentencing as we do in 
other contexts. Those justifications might exist, but we should determine 
what they are, and whether they are actually objections to variation or 
something else—whether concerns about arbitrariness, bias, dysfunc-
tional local politics, or what have you. 
III. EQUAL SENTENCING WITHOUT EQUAL SENTENCES 
If equality of outcomes crowds out key goals and values of punish-
ment, and if it is in tension with core principles of sentencing design, 
what does that say about its status as our main marker of sentencing 
fairness? It would be foolish to abandon all concern with outcomes 
when it comes to fairness in sentencing. Consistency is a weighty value 
in and of itself. And, as we discuss more below, disparity and variation 
can be important proxies for more worrisome factors at play, especially 
race. 
 
169 U.S. Const. amend. VI (guaranteeing public trial by “an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed”); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 
530 (1975) (“[W]e accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment . . . .”). 
170 See Schragger, supra note 18, at 471 (examining the normative dimension of the con-
cept of “community” in localism and showing how it can be used to “reinforce existing dis-
tributions of crime, municipal resources, and social, economic, and symbolic capit[a]l”); see 
also supra note 22 (noting definitional difficulties with the concept of “community”). 
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At the same time, this Part argues, when it comes to outcomes, sen-
tencing might better account for the fact that not all inequalities are cre-
ated equal. More flexible notions of equality in sentencing might better 
respect the range of competing considerations discussed in the preceding 
Parts while still policing punishments for bias or arbitrariness. Section 
III.A shows how a more elastic, less outcomes-driven approach to equal-
ity is consistent with the norms and practices that govern much of crimi-
nal justice outside of sentencing. Section III.B demonstrates how that in-
sight adds nuance to equality debates around restorative justice, Califor-
nia’s recent Realignment initiative, and federal use of fast-track plea 
agreements. All three are examples of sentencing practices that simulta-
neously generate significant outcome disparities while giving effect to 
many oft-excluded substantive, procedural, and institutional values. Sec-
tion III.C qualifies the limits of our analytical account and addresses 
some concerns about sorting good disparities from bad ones while still 
leaving room for legitimate variation in punishment. 
A. Process, Variation, and Punishment 
To question the conception of equalizing outcomes in sentencing is 
not to question commitment to the concept of equality itself in sentenc-
ing. As we noted at the outset, one can conceive of equality in a variety 
of ways. We do not here offer a lengthy account or precise definition of 
what those other approaches to equality might be. Our goal is less to de-
fend alternative conceptions of sentencing equality than to highlight the 
underappreciated costs and normative complexities inherent in focusing 
primarily on outcomes. What we can say, though, is that instead of fo-
cusing so much on outputs, many alternative conceptions of sentencing 
equality would focus more on inputs and process.171 Such process-driven 
conceptions of equality try to promote equal treatment by making deci-
 
171 But not all of them would. One could, for instance, imagine a substantive antisubordi-
nation approach to sentencing equality that takes into consideration the need to address race- 
and class-based inequalities that are rooted in our social structure and that infect the entire 
criminal justice system. Cf. Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System 
Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 261, 284–85 
(2007) (arguing that “[i]f we see capital punishment, mass incarceration, and police terror as 
modern extensions of a caste system . . . that continues to subjugate black people, eliminat-
ing racial bias from the criminal justice system requires their abolition,” and that abolition 
“opens the possibility of creating alternatives to prison as the dominant means of punish-
ment, as well as alternatives to criminal punishment as a dominant means of addressing so-
cial inequities”); infra notes 188–90. 
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sion making transparent and inclusive, in order to check excess, abuse, 
and caprice. They regulate the structures of decision making, not what 
comes out of it. 
To take a few examples, Vincent Chiao, Josh Bowers, David Strauss, 
and other scholars have defended an ex ante approach to equality in 
criminal justice that seeks to equalize defendants’ ex ante probabilities 
of being arrested, convicted, and sentenced in rough proportion to their 
desert.172 As Chiao explains it, so long as chances are “roughly equal-
iz[ed],” and so long as a system takes some care to ensure that discrete 
groups do not bear disproportionate risks of worse results, the system 
may, consistent with the notion of treating like cases alike, leave pun-
ishment to fall where it may.173 That is true even for identical cases, even 
though disparities in punishment for identically situated defendants 
might feel essentially random from the defendants’ perspectives.174 
Gerken contends that arguments for “federalism all the way down,” 
while leading to unequal outcomes in individual cases, nevertheless 
might foster a more systemic, “rough-and-tumble” vision of equality that 
recognizes the dignity in allowing minority viewpoints to hold sway.175  
Such alternative approaches to sentencing equality would better rec-
ognize and respect legitimate normative variations in punishment. Dif-
ferent counties, cities, neighborhoods, and communities might weigh the 
values and tradeoffs of punishment differently and stand for different 
things, especially where those communities are cohesive and stakehold-
 
172 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1677–78; Chiao, supra note 4; David A. 
Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike? 14–15 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Le-
gal Theory, Working Paper No. 24, 2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=312180 [https://p
erma.cc/K47X-6Y5M]; see also Whitman, supra note 44, at 141–42 (noting with approval 
that when it comes to equality in criminal justice, Continental jurisdictions, in contrast with 
American ones, seek to ensure preconviction equality in investigation, arrest, and prosecu-
tion as opposed to postconviction equality in punishment). 
173 Chiao, supra note 4, at 306, 331. 
174 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 172, at 21, 23–26 (arguing that “different outcomes” are 
defensible even in cases without “a morally relevant difference” as long as the outcomes are 
products of “a justifiable system” and “reasonably just institutions”); see also Neil Duxbury, 
Random Justice: On Lotteries and Legal Decision-Making 72 (1999) (arguing that random-
ness is permissible and even appropriate “where decision-makers struggle with indetermina-
cies”); David Lewis, The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance, 18 Phil. & Pub. Af-
fairs 53, 58–62 (1989) (tentatively defending “penal lotteries”). 
175 Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 17, at 53. Gerken is speaking specif-
ically to the issue of racial equality, but her point generalizes to minority or heterogeneous 
viewpoints that go beyond race, as she herself recognizes. See id. at 57 (noting that “federal-
ism all the way down” applies to “decisionmaking bodies of every sort”).  
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ers exercise real voice.176 Different sentencers—judges, juries, prosecu-
tors striking plea deals—might contextualize and sentence the same 
crimes differently, particularly in heterogeneous communities. To use 
Bowers’s illustration, one sentencer might consider undeserving of pun-
ishment a homeless man without easy access to a safe public restroom 
who urinates in a deserted alley. Another might view him blameworthy 
and an appropriate object of sanctions, given the impact of his act on a 
public space and the need to deter similar actions.177 Different people 
can reasonably disagree about how to weight substantive values or how 
best to implement them in a specific case. For reasons discussed in Part 
II, such variations in values or tactics are arguably legitimate, with up-
sides that are often overlooked in the face of the disparities they gener-
ate. 
The point generalizes to other crimes and sentencers, both at the front 
and back ends of the process. Because sentencing is highly contextual 
and normative, different decision makers inevitably bring different eval-
uative frameworks to bear on even identical cases. But that does not 
make all disparities suspect, as there are a host of countervailing factors 
to consider. 
Focusing solely on disparities also begs the question of why substan-
tive outcomes have to be the measure of sentencing equality in the first 
place. Rough-and-tumble approaches to equality have long underlain 
other aspects of criminal justice, like community policing and communi-
ty prosecution. A main goal of those movements, as Anthony Alfieri 
puts it, is to “advance the civic and dignitary interests of victims, of-
fenders, and communities of color” by injecting community norms, pri-
orities, and values into policing and prosecution through street-level col-
laboration with criminal justice officials.178 Doing so can create neigh-
borhood-to-neighborhood disparities in arrests, prosecutions, and, 
ultimately, punishments for identical conduct that violates the same 
citywide ordinances or statewide statutes. Scholars like Debra Living-
 
176 For a cautionary note about the circumstances under which this truly will be the case, 
see Schragger, supra note 18, at 444–59 (discussing problems with the “participatory de-
fense” of localism). 
177 Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1675–76. 
178 Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1465, 1469 (2002). 
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ston, for example, contend that policing should be geographically tai-
lored to the norms of specific streets.179 
Proponents of those movements ordinarily see that normative varia-
tion as a virtue, not a vice, despite the variations in outcomes it produc-
es. That was a chief argument of the supporters of Chicago’s Gang Con-
gregation Ordinance in Chicago v. Morales: that the ordinance resulted 
from the efforts of the inner-city, high-crime neighborhoods in which it 
was implemented, and that those communities should have special au-
tonomy to adopt norms that are responsive to local conditions.180 Alt-
hough the Supreme Court struck down the statute on vagueness grounds, 
some scholars have criticized the result. They argued that the federal 
courts should defer to community norms even when they diverge from 
independent constitutional guarantees (an argument we do not make 
here) because local communities are best positioned to trade off liberty 
and order in light of local circumstances.181 Doing so empowers local 
citizens, improving their buy-in and the law’s legitimacy and support. 
Even more fundamentally, unequal outcomes are endemic to all of 
criminal justice, not just sentencing. One police officer might detain a 
jaywalker while another does not. One prosecutor might divert a low-
level drug case while another insists on a guilty plea. One victim might 
decline to press charges; another might press for the maximum. Zoom-
ing the lens out, some municipalities might expansively prohibit “quality 
of life” offenses, with related impacts on everything from Fourth 
Amendment privacy to forfeiture of motor vehicles; others might take a 
 
179 Livingston, supra note 11, at 560–62; see also Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic 
Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public Space Zoning, 105 Yale 
L.J. 1165, 1167–85 (1996) (arguing for geographically specific norms and community stand-
ards as a basis for policing). 
180 527 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1999); see Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Or-
ganizations in Support of Petitioner at 5, Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (No. 97-1121), 1998 WL 
328366, at *5.  
181 Morales, 527 U.S. at 64; see Meares & Kahan, supra note 18, at 209–10 (arguing that 
the Warren Court’s top-down, judicially enforced individual rights approach to criminal pro-
cedure has outlived its usefulness and is impeding reform in an era of greater minority en-
franchisement and new approaches to community policing); Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuni-
form Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of 
Community, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1129, 1138 (1999) (criticizing the state supreme court holding 
in Morales on the ground that it “overlooked geographical nonuniformity”). But see Schrag-
ger, supra note 18, at 374 (critiquing localist arguments in defense of the Chicago ordi-
nance). 
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more hands-off approach.182 Some jurisdictions might legalize marijuana 
use; others might criminalize it. Some of these differences might be at-
tributable to varying normative approaches to any number of underlying 
issues: criminalization, resource allocation, and perspectives on blame 
and punishment. Others might seem random, attributable to dumb luck: 
nothing more than jaywalking in the wrong place at the wrong time. In 
neither case, though, do we ordinarily insist on equality of outcomes. 
Our usual approach instead is similar to Chiao’s.183 So long as the differ-
ences are a product of a justifiable institutional design, we let the chips 
fall where they may.184 
Why should sentencing be any different? One might try to argue that 
outcomes should matter more in sentencing because sentencing out-
comes, unlike others, are uniquely and inherently coercive. But that is a 
difference of degree, not kind. Arrest patterns, prosecutorial charging 
decisions, and towns’ and cities’ decisions about how to regulate prima-
ry conduct are also coercive, sometimes severely so.185 Even if one could 
draw a line based on degree, that line would be false. That is because ar-
rests, charging decisions, primary conduct rules, and other early-stage 
criminal justice decisions are just as critical, if not more so, to the sub-
stantive penalties that cash out at sentencing as is the sentencing process 
itself. Wrongdoers who never get arrested, or whose cases get dismissed, 
get sentences of zero, while those who get arrested, charged, prosecuted, 
and convicted get much heavier sentences for the same crime. In a world 
of plea bargaining, mandatory minimum sentences, and sentencing 
 
182 For an extensive treatment of how such municipal regulation intersects with criminal 
justice, see Logan, supra note 48. 
183 Chiao, supra note 4, at 306, 331.  
184 As Judge Posner puts it, objecting to “ex post inequality among offenders . . . is like 
saying that all lotteries are unfair because, ex post, they create wealth differences among the 
players. . . . [T]he criminal justice system . . . and the lottery are fair so long as the ex ante 
costs and benefits are equalized among the participants.” Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1213 (1985); see also John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice 75–76 (1971) (arguing that a series of fair bets necessarily will produce a 
“distribution of cash after the last bet that is fair, or at least not unfair, whatever that distribu-
tion is”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1677–78 (similarly arguing that “there is no 
persuasive reason why equal treatment must be measured according to substantive outcomes 
only”). 
185 To see this, one need only look at some of the arguments against the ordinance in the 
Morales case. Opponents argued, among other things, that they no longer felt free to engage 
in a wide range of incontestably innocuous behavior—such as, to use Justice Stevens’ exam-
ple, loitering outside Wrigley field in hopes of glimpsing Sammy Sosa leaving the ballpark, 
see 527 U.S. at 60—in light of the power that the ordinance conferred upon the police. 
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guidelines, prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions are huge de-
terminants of sanctions.186 Because sentencing is a pipeline in which de-
cisions upstream greatly influence punishment determinations down-
stream, requiring substantive equality of outcomes at sentencing requires 
substantive equality of arrests, charges, and most other criminal justice 
decisions as well.187 
That same feature also forecloses any argument that equalizing out-
comes at sentencing is needed to correct upstream disparities that have 
infected the criminal justice pipeline earlier in the process. Sentencing 
cannot do that when those earlier decisions cabin downstream punish-
ments themselves. Indeed, equalizing outcomes at sentencing locks in 
earlier unequal decisions to arrest, charge, and plea bargain, much as the 
inability to bring disparate-impact claims under the Equal Protection 
Clause allows facially neutral state action to lock in pre-existing inequal-
ities of race and class.188 A number of studies suggest that, with so much 
determined at the front end through arrest, charging, and plea bargain-
ing, tamping down on discretion at sentencing in an attempt to equalize 
back-end outcomes might on the whole just make things worse.189 Para-
doxically, if that is true, then what is needed to achieve equality of pun-
ishment throughout the system as a whole might be more back-end ine-
qualities of certain kinds, not less. At the very least, the system would 
need to retain flexibility through sentencing at the back end to counter-
act potentially flawed decisions at the front.190 Locking down discretion 
 
186 See Bierschbach & Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, supra note 118, at 36–37 
(unpacking the relationship of upstream decisions to downstream punishments). 
187 Cf. Whitman, supra note 44, at 146 (decrying the false equality that results in a system 
that imposes “theoretically uniform” punishment on offenders while tolerating “a high risk 
of arbitrary treatment in the processes of investigation, prosecution, and determination of 
guilt”). 
188 See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1144–46 (1997). 
189 E.g., Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: 
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 Yale L.J. 2, 77–80 (2013); 
M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. 
Pol. Econ. 1320, 1334–45 (2014). Other studies suggest the opposite. E.g., Susan R. Klein & 
Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 
232.  
190 The late Bill Stuntz put it well when noting how vague substantive standards that im-
part discretion to juries and judges can help to equalize the criminal justice playing field by 
counteracting potentially unequal decision making by prosecutors: “[W]hen prosecutors 
have enormous discretionary power, giving other decisionmakers discretion promotes con-
sistency, not arbitrariness. Vague legal lines give more discretion to juries and trial judges. 
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at sentencing might prevent the system from becoming even more une-
qual at that stage of the process. But it also leaves no room to make 
things better, and, by formally addressing equality concerns so late in 
the game, it might impart a false sense of having dealt with the problem 
to boot.191 
None of this is to say that comparative outcomes do not matter to sen-
tencing. Nor is it to suggest that sentencing should be a free-for-all in 
which almost any value judgment goes. Like other criminal justice deci-
sions, sentencing cannot be based on factors that offend independent 
constitutional principles like equal protection. In that vein, sentencing 
might conceptually borrow from the tiers of equal-protection scrutiny.192 
Variations based on racial, ethnic, or religious bias or implicating fun-
damental rights, of course, receive strict scrutiny and are almost always 
unconstitutional. Variations based on sex or illegitimacy would receive 
intermediate scrutiny, but may survive if related to an important state in-
terest. For instance, mitigating sentences for custodial parents might dis-
parately help mothers, but that could be justifiable if they are the sole or 
primary caretakers of their children.193 Other variations are less trou-
 
Discretion limits discretion; institutional competition curbs excess and abuse.” Stuntz, supra 
note 15, at 304. The same logic could apply to giving useful feedback to legislatures and sen-
tencing commissions about the substance of sentencing itself. Cf. United States v. Van-
deBrake, 771 F. Supp. 2d 961, 1011 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (acknowledging that the court’s up-
ward departure from the “Sentencing Guidelines’s relatively lenient treatment of antitrust 
violations when compared to fraud sentences” would “understandably result in a sentencing 
disparity between the defendants here and those sentenced previously,” but concluding that 
“the disparity is entirely warranted in order to reflect the seriousness that Sherman Act viola-
tions pose to the well-being of the nation”). 
191 Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 110, at 435 (arguing that the extensive constitutional 
regulation of the death penalty has done little to advance equality while simultaneously legit-
imating capital punishment by leaving sentencers “with a false sense that their power is safe-
ly circumscribed”). 
192 See generally Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 Mich. L. 
Rev. 459, 461 (2010) (explaining how doctrines and rationales may be imported “from one 
area of constitutional law into another for persuasive ends”). 
193 See Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 St. 
Louis. U. L.J. 113, 114, 159 (2009) (discussing the “best interests of the child standard” as a 
compelling state interest (capitalization omitted)); see also Lanette P. Dalley, Imprisoned 
Mothers and Their Children: Their Often Conflicting Legal Rights, 22 Hamline J. Pub. L. & 
Pol’y 1, 16–17 (2000) (arguing that “there is a disproportionately negative impact 
on . . . children from maternal incarceration than from paternal incarceration” because, un-
like when fathers are incarcerated, “when mothers are imprisoned, the[ir] children are often 
left inadequately cared for”). 
 As a matter of positive law, given how narrowly the Supreme Court has construed the 
concept of sex classifications, whether a sentencing practice like this one would trigger in-
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bling, though wealth-based ones still deserve attention given Gideon v. 
Wainwright’s effort to achieve at least minimally equal justice for rich 
and poor.194 But, all else being equal, there is much less reason to fear 
geographic variation, say, than racial bias.195 
Sentences likewise should adhere to some rough norms of consistency 
and proportionality—one prosecutor or judge’s treating an action as a 
misdemeanor while a neighboring prosecutor or judge treats the identi-
cal action as a capital offense would certainly be unfair no matter how 
normative and well-reasoned the divergence.196 Prosecutorial decisions 
that influence sentencing variations currently do not face even rational-
basis scrutiny; they could stand a little more review, perhaps for abuse 
of discretion.197 And we might worry about even consistent and constitu-
tionally permissible normative variations in sentencing if they generate 
intolerable spillovers or undermine larger and clearly established crimi-
nal justice policies resulting from well-functioning political processes.198 
One community should not be able to externalize the costs of its sen-
tencing preferences onto others or to discrete and insular groups, nor 
should sentencing be an excuse to flout applicable substantive law with 
 
termediate as opposed to rational basis scrutiny is far from certain. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. 
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274–80 (1979) (rejecting equal protection challenge to a state vet-
erans’ preference statute after finding that, even though the law overwhelmingly worked to 
favor men over women in state employment, it did not amount to a sex-based classification 
that would trigger heightened scrutiny); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1974) 
(holding that unemployment insurance classification of work loss from normal pregnancy as 
a noncompensable event was not a sex-based classification under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
194 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
195 In some circumstances, of course, geography can be an important proxy for race. 
196 Cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment: On the Limits of 
Reason and the Virtue of Randomization, in Criminal Law Conversations 163, 167–70 (Paul 
H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009) (arguing that it is 
permissible for criminal justice to “turn to the lottery” in making punishment decisions so 
long as punishments remain within reasonable ranges). 
197 Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Ap-
proach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657, 1669 (2004) (acknowledging that prosecutorial decisions 
not to indict “‘ha[ve] long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch,’” 
but arguing that analogous administrative agency decisions not to enforce nevertheless 
should be subject to arbitrary and capricious review (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 832 (1985)). 
198 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General 
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 119 (2010) (linking the contours of con-
stitutional federalism to the minimization of spillovers). 
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which sentencers disagree.199 But in operationalizing these and other 
qualifications, we should better account for the fact that outcomes are 
not talismanic, and that disparities in punishment can carry benefits as 
well as costs. Even random variations may amount to natural experi-
ments, serving as fodder for empirical researchers seeking to learn what 
works best. 
B. Experiments in Unequal Outcomes 
Considering the benefits as well as the costs of disparity casts equality 
critiques of many sentencing practices and policies in a more productive 
light. We consider three illustrations here: restorative justice, Califor-
nia’s recent Realignment initiative, and federal fast-track programs for 
processing large volumes of immigration and drug crimes, primarily 
along the southwestern border. Each has been the target of the conven-
tional equality-of-outcomes critique. And each illuminates the limits of 
that framework and how it can obscure the upsides of sentencing varia-
tions and useful normative appraisal of the forces—whether substantive, 
procedural, or institutional—that drive them. 
1. Restorative Justice 
Restorative justice is a sentencing-reform movement involving “a 
process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come 
together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the of-
fense and its implications for the future.”200 It focuses on victims, of-
fenders, and affected community members and it can be intensely per-
sonal. Offenders are encouraged to apologize and to repair the harm they 
have caused, with the hope of healing and reconciliation between the 
victim, offender, and the community of which they are a part.201 
 
199 See id. at 164 (citing the concern that “medical marijuana use in California makes it 
more difficult to police drug traffickers at the Arizona border” as an example of a potential 
spillover problem that pushed against deference to the local substantive criminal law at issue 
in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)). 
200 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 
in 25 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 1, 5 (Michael Tonry ed., 1999) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting definition of restorative justice formulated by Tony Mar-
shall).  
201 See Bibas & Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology, supra note 14, at 103 
(discussing the basic tenets of restorative justice). 
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It is easy to see how seeking to equalize outcomes leaves little room 
for a sentencing approach like this. Restorative justice’s emphasis on the 
particular defendant’s and victim’s human relationships stands at odds 
with mechanistically equalizing punishments. The same is true of thera-
peutic jurisprudence’s efforts to teach and heal each offender holistical-
ly. Outcomes-based equality reasoning abstracts from individual cases, 
while restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence are intensely par-
ticularistic. Choosing to equalize outcomes thus means forgoing the 
healing and reconciliation envisioned by those movements, because of 
their “high potential for giving similar offenders strikingly disparate 
treatment” based on the idiosyncrasies of their victims or the communi-
ties in which their crimes occur.202 Supporters of restorative justice typi-
cally grasp this nettle. They embrace the individualized, tailored, highly 
contextualized approach to sentencing that restorative justice involves, 
and they stand ready to sacrifice uniformity of outcomes in doing so.203 
But framing the debate as uniformity versus individualization or pro-
equality versus anti-equality misses a much subtler point: The two sides 
are using equality arguments differently to emphasize different aspects 
of criminal justice. As Michael O’Hear perceptively explains, restorative 
justice opponents often treat equality as making outcomes equal and 
predictable ex ante, before anyone commits a crime.204 That ensures that 
potential offenders and others have fair warning and can be deterred. 
They also frequently emphasize making sentences retributively propor-
tional to each crime’s actus reus and mens rea, no matter the victim’s or 
community’s views. Restorative justice conflicts with both of these ap-
proaches to equalizing outcomes because it depends substantially on 
what happens after a case enters the criminal justice system.205 
Supporters of restorative justice highlight other ways to frame equali-
ty that are better served by this principle. Equality could mean treating 
cases equally once they enter the criminal justice system. It could mean 
proportioning punishments to the complete range of purposes they serve, 
 
202 David Dolinko, The Practice of Restorative Justice: Restorative Justice and the Justifi-
cation of Punishment, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 319, 331; accord Paul H. Robinson, The Practice of 
Restorative Justice: The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 
2003 Utah L. Rev. 375, 381. 
203  Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United 
States, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 413, 433; Dolinko, supra note 202, at 331–34 (discussing John 
Braithwaite’s views). 
204 O’Hear, supra note 3, at 309–12. 
205 Id. 
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so offenders who are equally blameworthy, equally contrite, and equally 
amenable to reform et cetera are treated equally. It could mean treating 
offenders with equal dignity, respect, and autonomy.206 Or it could even 
mean treating victims equally as well by factoring in their losses, suffer-
ing, and need for restoration. To traditional retributivists or deterrence 
theorists, these alternative approaches to equality are obviously wrong if 
not nonsensical.207 But that bewilderment just goes to show how deeply 
an outcomes-focused approach to equality has colored the restorative 
justice debate. 
Exposing the contestable nature of equality arguments in restorative 
justice does not make that debate go away. But it does free us up to fo-
cus on the issues that the conventional equality framing is driving un-
derground. Those might have to do with which purposes of punishment 
and sentencing values are legitimate. They might have to do with the 
theoretical justification for according victims’ views any weight in crim-
inal justice in general, and sentencing in particular.208 They might have 
to do with practical concerns about doing so, especially concerns about 
conscious and unconscious bias that can infect interpersonal interactions 
between victims and their offenders.209 
Confronting those issues more directly might at least allow for more 
clear-eyed assessments of the costs, benefits, justifications, and limita-
tions of restorative practices. Seeing victims not as idiosyncratic deter-
minants of defendants’ fates but as another locus of diversity in the 
chain of “federalism all the way down” could point up a further (albeit 
controversial) justification for including them at sentencing.210 Similarly, 
 
206 Id. at 319–24. 
207 See Dolinko, supra note 202, at 331–34 (expressing bewilderment at Braithwaite’s in-
clusion of victims as watering down defendants’ right to equal punishments). 
208 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance, and the 
Role of Government, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1599, 1601–05 (2000); Alon Harel, Why Only 
the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case Against Privately Inflicted Sanctions, 14 
Legal Theory 113, 115–22 (2008).  
209 See Susan A. Bandes, Remorse and Demeanor in the Courtroom: Cognitive Science 
and the Evaluation of Contrition 13–26 (DePaul Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 14-05, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2363326 [https://perma.cc/WZU9-PA9Z] (detail-
ing how implicit bias can affect perceptions and evaluations of defendants’ remorse, contri-
tion, and similar emotions and expressions, and how such bias is especially worrisome 
across cultural, ethnic, and racial lines). 
210 See Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 17, at 22 n.59 (noting that “[i]n 
theory, we could push federalism down to private associations, even individuals”); see also 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism as Westphalian Liberalism, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 769, 
781–93 (2006) (laying out such an account outside the context of restorative justice). 
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seeing differences between victims in restorative justice as no different 
from other differences between victims that routinely influence out-
comes—think of the classic “eggshell” victim—might complicate argu-
ments about the legitimacy of using restorative processes that result in 
varied outcomes. Focusing on bias might lead one to search for and 
more rigorously analyze specific constructive reforms, like better train-
ing for conference facilitators and better preconference preparation for 
victims, defendants, and other participants in restorative processes.211 
Such measures will do little to harmonize outcomes. But, in addition to 
minimizing bias, they could bring a host of other benefits that laypersons 
embrace as essential to sentencing fairness, including greater accounta-
bility, legitimacy, and realization of many of the softer values and goals 
of sentencing, both procedural and substantive.212 
2. Realignment 
In 2011, the California legislature enacted AB 109, the Public Safety 
Realignment Act, popularly known as “Realignment.”213 Realignment 
responded to the Supreme Court’s decision earlier that year in Brown v. 
Plata, which ordered California to reduce its state prison population to 
137.5% of design capacity within two years to relieve extreme over-
crowding that had led to violations of the Eighth Amendment.214 It did 
so by transferring responsibility for large numbers of low-level felons—
those convicted of nonviolent, nonserious, and nonsexual crimes (or 
“triple nons”)—from the state prison and parole system to the local jails 
and probation officers of California’s fifty-eight counties. Each county 
receives state funding to deal with its offenders, and each is given nearly 
 
211 For a thoughtful recent examination of some aspects of bias in restorative justice and 
constructive approaches to addressing it, see generally Meredith Rossner, Just Emotions: 
Rituals of Restorative Justice 1–14 (2013).  
212 See Robinson, supra note 202, at 375–77 (discussing various benefits of restorative 
processes); Rossner, supra note 211, at 25–26 (connecting the perceived fairness of restora-
tive justice procedures to the increased legitimacy of the state and of sanctions); ; see also 
Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 3–7 (2006) (discussing the importance of proce-
dural justice to respect for criminal justice system).  
213  S.B. 89, 2013 Leg., Comm. on Budget & Fiscal Review (Cal. 2013); A.B. 109, 2011–
2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); see also A.B. 117, 2011 Leg., Comm. on Budget (Cal. 
2011); A.B. 118, 2011 Leg., Comm. on Budget (Cal. 2011).  
214 130 S. Ct. 1910, 1944–47 (2011); see Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and 
Its Impact on Local Criminal Justice Systems, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 327, 327 (2014) (de-
scribing the legislative response to Plata). 
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unfettered discretion to design its own punishment policies.215 By forc-
ing counties to internalize the costs of conviction and sentencing, Rea-
lignment seeks to mitigate what Frank Zimring and Gordon Hawkins 
famously called the problem of the “correctional free lunch”: namely, 
that states pay for prisons, but local prosecutorial and sentencing deci-
sions fill them.216 And by keeping offenders closer to their families, so-
cial groups, and community-based services and support networks, it also 
aims to take a more holistic approach to punishment that better promotes 
rehabilitation and reentry and, ultimately, reduces recidivism.217 
Several years into Realignment, scholars are furiously gathering data 
on what The Economist dubbed “one of the great experiments in Ameri-
can incarceration policy.”218 But already one thing is clear: Realignment 
is spawning notably disparate approaches to punishment among and 
within California’s counties. Counties vary enormously in how they 
spend their Realignment funds, using jail time, treatment, reentry ser-
vices, prevention, and a host of other penal policies at widely different 
rates and in widely different ways.219 For example, an offender convict-
 
215 See Petersilia, supra note 214, at 327 (providing an overview of Realignment). 
216 Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, The Scale of Imprisonment 140 (1991); see 
also Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 12, at 78–79 (discussing the problem and placing it 
in historical perspective). 
217 Cal. Penal Code § 17.5 (Deering 2008 & Supp. 2016) (encouraging use of “locally run 
community-based corrections programs”); see also id. § 17.5(a)(8) (mentioning restorative 
justice, home detention, and work release plans as examples of appropriate alternative com-
munity-based sanctions); Jessica Spencer & Joan Petersilia, Voices from the Field: Califor-
nia Victims’ Rights in a Post-Realignment World, 25 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 226, 229 (2013) 
(“One of the driving theories behind Realignment was that officials closer to an offender’s 
community would be able to watch them more closely and offer better rehabilitative services 
than the more detached, state-level government, with the ultimate goal of reducing recidi-
vism and victimization.”). 
218 Prison Overcrowding: The Magic Number, Economist, May 11, 2013, at 32; see also 
Petersilia, supra note 214, at 327 (calling Realignment “a prison downsizing experiment of 
historical significance”); Aaron J. Rappaport, Realigning California Corrections, 25 Fed. 
Sent’g Rep. 207, 207 (2013) (“[Realignment] is probably the greatest de-incarceration exper-
iment in American history . . . .”). 
219 See Sara Abarbanel et al., Stanford Criminal Justice Ctr., Realigning the Revolving 
Door: An Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109 2011-2012 Implementation Plans 18–20 
(2013), http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/child-page/183091/do
c/slspublic/Realigning%20the%20Revolving%20Door%20with%20updates%20for%2058%
20counties%20080113.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6BM-PKG3]; Jeffrey Lin & Joan Petersilia, 
Follow the Money: How California Counties Are Spending Their Public Safety Realignment 
Funds (Stanford Criminal Justice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2012-IJ-CX-0002, 2014), http://l
aw.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/443760/doc/slsp
ublic/Lin%20Money%20Final%20Report%20022814.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YTS-HYLQ].  
COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2016] What’s Wrong with Sentencing Equality? 1505 
ed in Yuba County is roughly six times more likely to spend time in lo-
cal jail than is an offender convicted in Sierra County.220 When one ac-
counts for the fact that localities can continue to choose state prison for 
“triple nons” with serious records and for certain “wobbler” offenses, 
the disparities increase even more.221 Jail experiences are also diverging 
more after Realignment, with Realignment funding jailhouse Reentry 
Pods and Alternative Sentencing Planners in one county while it might 
fund the expansion of a more traditional command and control facility in 
the next.222 So too are other significant determinants of punishment, like 
whether and which evidence-based practices and risk-assessment tools 
counties use in tailoring sanctions.223 Commentators have decried the re-
sulting disparities in outcomes as unequal “justice by geography.”224 As 
one critic puts it, after Realignment, “A defendant who victimizes five 
separate people with identity fraud in Los Angeles is bound to be treated 
 
220 See Magnus Lofstrom & Steven Raphael, Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., Impact of Realign-
ment on County Jail Populations 17 (2013), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/re
port/R_613MLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8LG-LAGE].  
221 Mike Males and Lizzie Buchen, for example, report that even after accounting for 
county size and arrest rate, felons arrested in San Joaquin County are five times as likely to 
be sent to state prison as are those arrested in San Francisco County. Mike Males & Lizzie 
Buchen, Ctr. on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, Research Brief, Beyond Realignment: Coun-
ties’ Large Disparities in Imprisonment Underlie Ongoing Prison Crisis 4 (2013), 
http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/beyond_realignment_march_2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G8D3-QSQT]. Statewide, their findings show a range of 2.5% state prison 
usage (San Francisco County) to 24% state prison usage (Kings County). Id. When one looks 
at “triple non-violent” offenders with serious records, the disparity jumps even more. Id. at 5 
(finding a 35:1 disparity in state prison usage for drug offenses between Kings County and 
Contra Costa County).  
222 See Abarbanel et al., supra note 219, at 55–57 (describing use of realignment funding 
for expanding existing jails and reopening closed jail space); Petersilia, supra note 214, at 
350 (noting “[p]rogressive sheriffs’” use of their state jail construction funds to build jails 
having “space for more programming with an eye towards reentry planning”); Wendy S. 
Still, San Francisco Realignment: Raising the Bar for Criminal Justice in California, 25 Fed. 
Sent’g. Rep. 246, 248–49 (2013) (citing examples of Reentry Pods and Alternative Sentenc-
ing Planners in San Francisco). 
223 See Abarbanel et al., supra note 219, at 41–43 (cataloging each county’s evidence-
based practices and risk-assessment tools after Realignment); Susan Turner & Julie Ger-
linger, Risk Assessment and Realignment, 53 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1039, 1042, 1045–47 
(2013) (noting that Realignment “virtually ignores risk,” and reviewing counties’ different 
approaches to evidence-based practices and risk-assessment tools). 
224 Males & Buchen, supra note 221, at 1. 
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differently than the one who commits the same crimes in San Francisco. 
Is this equal protection of the law?”225 
From our perspective, it could be. At the very least, the answer is 
more complicated than the question suggests. Realignment illustrates 
why it is crucial to cut through generalized outcomes-based rhetoric and 
focus on what exactly is troubling about sentencing variation. One con-
cern might be that similarly situated offenders should not receive differ-
ent treatment simply by virtue of the county they happen to be in when 
they violate a state statute. But that argument, which emphasizes equali-
ty of outcomes within sovereign state lines, runs directly into the localist 
design of Realignment itself.226 
A key notion behind the statute was that counties should have discre-
tion to design sentencing around local priorities, preferences, and 
needs.227 This means that some counties, like San Francisco, might take 
a more progressive approach to sentencing that emphasizes treatment, 
rehabilitation, reintegration, and many of the other factors that often are 
lost in rigid outcomes-focused equality regimes. Others, as Jeffrey Lin 
and Joan Petersilia have shown, choose to put resources into more tradi-
tional incapacitative or deterrence-driven approaches to punishment.228 
 
225 Lisa Rodriguez, Criminal Justice Realignment: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 25 Fed. 
Sent’g Rep. 220, 222 (2013). Rodriguez’s criticism is interesting because, unlike most out-
comes-focused critiques of sentencing, it appears to turn on equality of outcomes for victims 
as opposed to defendants. 
226 Even were this not the case, absent recourse to an unjustified sentencing exception, it is 
hard to see how Realignment’s disparate sentencing outcomes are any more suspect in equal-
ity terms than are other disparate outcomes that flow from different county- and city-level 
approaches to statewide legal issues, both within and outside of criminal justice. The Los 
Angeles County and San Francisco Police Departments, for instance, undoubtedly approach 
a host of statewide criminal justice issues very differently, and have done so since long be-
fore Realignment. Treatment of low-level marijuana offenses is one example. See Daniel 
Macallair & Mike Males, Ctr. on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, Marijuana Arrests and Cali-
fornia’s Drug War: A Report to the California Legislature, 2010 Update (2010), 
http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/Marijuana_Arrests_and_Californias_Drug_War-
2010_Update.pdf. [https://perma.cc/FZU4-M6H3]; see also Office of the Attorney Gen., 
State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, CJSC Statistics: Arrests, https://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc/st
ats/arrests [https://perma.cc/8RPU-SM3C] (reporting California misdemeanor arrest rates 
from 1999 through 2008).  
227 See Petersilia, supra note 214, at 328 (“Realignment . . . allows each county unprece-
dented flexibility and authority to . . . manage realigned offenders in a way that makes the 
most sense locally.”); cf. Stephen F. Smith, Localism and Capital Punishment, 64 Vand. L. 
Rev. En Banc 105, 110 (2011) (“[T]he most important benefit of localism in criminal justice 
[is] its tendency to make the enforcement of criminal law more responsive to the values, pri-
orities, and felt needs of local communities.”). 
228 Lin & Petersilia, supra note 219, at 5, 12–13, 21. 
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In enacting Realignment, the California legislature consciously meant to 
encourage that very flexibility, innovation, experimentation, and hence, 
variation in sentencing, with all of its attendant costs and benefits. The 
purpose of the statute, in short, was to allow for—if not create—
beneficial intercounty disparities in the sentencing treatment of 
statewide crimes. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the speed with which it was conceived 
and rolled out, Realignment has suffered from, and continues to suffer 
from, implementation and planning-related issues,229 and the data is still 
too new to draw any firm conclusions. Even so, based on early returns, 
and despite and even because of the sentencing disparities it has created, 
its benefits already appear to be significant. They include marked cost 
savings coupled with reductions in recidivism in some counties, greater 
interbranch and interagency collaboration, more effective experimenta-
tion with evidence-based sentencing practices, and the creation of doz-
ens of innovative and bottom-up reentry programs that, as Petersilia ex-
plains, “will undoubtedly serve as incubator sites and pilot tests for scal-
ing up of successful interventions.”230 
At the same time, looking beyond outcomes to the reasons for some 
of the sentencing variations that have emerged after Realignment might 
surface different types of equality concerns that are not well-captured by 
a less nuanced approach. It is one thing if disparities result from the di-
vergent local preferences of similarly resourced counties. It is another 
thing if the main reason that Yuba County utilizes jail at such a high rate 
is because, unlike San Francisco, it does not have the pre-existing infra-
structure or finances to implement resource-intensive alternative ap-
 
229 See Allen Hopper et al., Shifting the Paradigm or Shifting the Problem? The Politics of 
California’s Criminal Justice Realignment, 54 Santa Clara L. Rev. 527, 581–93 (2014) (de-
tailing issues with the rollout of Realignment); Petersilia, supra note 214, at 338–56 (detail-
ing Realignment’s implementation issues as perceived by various stakeholders); Joan Peter-
silia & Jessica Greenlick Snyder, Looking Past the Hype: 10 Questions Everyone Should 
Ask About California’s Prison Realignment, 5 Cal. J. Pol. & Pol’y 266, 266–69 (2013) (dis-
cussing the potential downsides of and open issues regarding Realignment). 
230 Petersilia, supra note 214, at 339, 343; see also Leroy D. Baca & Gerald K. Cooper, 
Can AB 109 Work in Los Angeles County?, 25 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 241, 243–44 (2013) (de-
scribing Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s Maximizing Education, Reaching Indi-
vidual Transformation (“MERIT”) program, reworked under Realignment, which now pro-
vides substance abuse treatment in collaboration with substance abuse professionals); Rodri-
guez, supra note 225, at 222–23 (describing developments spurred by Realignment in San 
Diego County, including a collaborative Mandatory Supervision Court). 
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proaches, its preference for doing so notwithstanding.231 It is one thing if 
real differences in criminal history, local crime patterns, or even penal 
philosophy are driving some counties’ continued use of state prison at 
far higher rates than others. It is another thing if county prosecutors are 
using state prison to shift punishment costs out of their jurisdictions and 
back to the rest of California’s population, or if politically powerless 
groups are being cut out of local decision making on how to approach 
Realignment reforms.232 
These possibilities, too, raise equality concerns. But they are input- 
and process-based concerns that might well call for process-based re-
sponses. If the concern is the continued externalization of prison costs 
for “triple nons” with serious records, one answer might be to expand 
Realignment to require localities to shoulder more of those costs.233 If 
the concern is historical resource disparities that make it hard for poor 
counties to pursue nonjail alternatives, one response might be to adjust 
Realignment’s funding formula to take that into account.234 If the con-
cern is lack of voice by disadvantaged groups, one thought might be to 
vest more control in a body comprising representatives of all stakehold-
ers.235 Sentencing disparities are not problems in and of themselves, but 
work as proxies that prompt us to interrogate the reasons behind varia-
tions, illuminating issues and solutions that a reflexive focus on equaliz-
ing outcomes can obscure. 
The same complexities might inform how we look at even intracounty 
disparities. In devolving decisions about punishment policy to localities 
for “triple nons,” Realignment gave prosecutors and judges wide discre-
tion to choose between “straight sentence[s]” (jail time with no post-
release supervision), “split sentence[s]” (with the sentence divided be-
tween jail time and community supervision), and more “traditional felo-
 
231 See Petersilia, supra note 214, at 350–51 (observing that for counties already “rich in 
resources and with jail beds to spare, Realignment has been an opportunity to expand and 
create innovative programming”). 
232 See Males & Buchen, supra note 221, at 6 (explaining that counties that choose to 
maintain high rates of state incarceration are effectively forcing other counties to subsidize 
the formers’ prison commitments). 
233 See id. (suggesting this approach). 
234 Cf. Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 12, at 107–09 (making a similar point outside 
the Realignment context). 
235 Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 
Fed. Sent’g. Rep. 153, 155 (2009) (observing that successful sentencing bodies include both 
“those groups that typically get muted in the legislative process” and “those powerful groups 
who are readily heard”). 
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ny probation.”236 Individual judges and prosecutors vary in their use of 
such options, especially whether and how to use split sentences.237 That 
has prompted criticism that, even within a single county, similarly situ-
ated offenders might receive meaningfully different punishments from 
courthouse to courthouse.238 
Again, though, we need to know more about the reasons for these dis-
parities before critiquing them, not just that they exist. One might defend 
some courthouse-to-courthouse variation in how prosecutors charge and 
judges sentence similar offenders as strong instances of “federalism-all-
the-way-down.” To take a non-Realignment example, a low-level felon 
who appears before Judge Alex Calabrese’s community court at the Red 
Hook Community Justice Center in Red Hook, Brooklyn, will receive a 
very different disposition from the same felon who is funneled to a dif-
ferent courthouse because he happens to commit his crime one precinct 
over. That is undoubtedly an intracounty, courthouse-to-courthouse dis-
parity. But it is one that stems from a considered philosophy of sentenc-
ing with community buy-in, which complicates its normative status.239 
The Red Hook disparity, if one wants to call it that, has real upsides. The 
Red Hook Community Justice Center receives exceedingly high marks 
on virtually every measure of sentencing justice—from cost effective-
ness, recidivism and arrest rates, and use of jail time, to perceptions of 
justice and fairness among victims, offenders, and community mem-
 
236 See Robert Weisberg & Lisa T. Quan, Stan. Crim. Just. Ctr., Assessing Judicial Sen-
tencing Preferences After Public Safety Realignment: A Survey of California Judges, 8 
(2014), https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/443996/doc/slspublic/Ju
dges%20Report%20Feb%2028%202014%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VFT-4VRW] 
(summarizing sentencing options under Realignment).  
237 See id. at 14, 58 (finding wide variation in how judges use split sentences); see also W. 
David Ball & Robert Weisberg, Stan. Crim. Just. Ctr., The New Normal? Prosecutorial 
Charging in California After Public Safety Realignment, 14–15 (2014), https://www.law.s
tanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/513777/doc/slspublic/DA%20report%20
Feb%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/X25R-H34L] (finding a “huge variance” in how prosecu-
tors use straight sentences, split sentences, and felony probation).  
238 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 225, at 222. 
239 For a comprehensive look at the history, philosophy, practices, and criminal justice 
outcomes of the Red Hook Community Justice Center, see generally Cynthia G. Lee et al., 
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Final Report, A Community Court Grows in Brooklyn: A Com-
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bers—except equality of sentencing outcomes vis-à-vis neighboring 
courthouses.240 
It might be that some of Realignment’s intracounty sentencing varia-
tions likewise spring from different philosophies of sentencing.241 But it 
also might be the case that prosecutors and judges agree for the most 
part on how to approach sentences in the abstract, but do not have the 
right tools for translating those views into more consistent outcomes 
across individual cases. There is some evidence of that. In a study of ju-
dicial sentencing preferences after Realignment, Robert Weisberg and 
Lisa Quan found that while many judges think that offenders should face 
“jail plus a tail,” they do not have a good sense of their fellow judges’ 
views on how long or short the jail time or tail should be, which makes 
it hard to coordinate across similar cases.242 Some judges and prosecu-
tors also lack either information about or faith in the details of communi-
ty supervision, which can breed reluctance to use it despite their desire 
to do so.243 These process-focused problems invite process-focused solu-
tions. Just gathering and publishing better intracounty data on disposi-
tions and establishing other formal or informal means of coordination 
and information sharing for judges, prosecutors, and community super-
visors would be a good start.244 Those measures will not eliminate dis-
parities, but they could help to sort “accidental” ones from ones that 
have more normative purchase. 
 
240 Cynthia Lee and her coauthors found that an overwhelming majority of local residents 
support the Red Hook Community Justice Center, and approval ratings among community 
members of police, prosecutors, and judges have also jumped since the center opened. The 
vast bulk of defendants at Red Hook feel they have been treated fairly, regardless of their 
background or case outcome. Red Hook has reduced recidivism by adult misdemeanor of-
fenders by twenty percent compared to traditional criminal courts while simultaneously re-
ducing the use of jail time by nearly thirty percent, and it has substantially reduced overall 
arrest levels as well. Id. at 65–66, 78, 86–87, 148, 153.  
241 At least one California prosecutor appears to believe so. See Rodriguez, supra note 225, 
at 222 (stating that “judges with courtrooms right next to each other may have very different 
philosophies about [the] new practice” of split sentencing). 
242 Weisberg & Quan, supra note 236, at 10, 14. 
243 See Ball & Weisberg, supra note 237, at 17; Weisberg & Quan, supra note 236, at 59.  
244 See, e.g., Ball & Weisberg, supra note 237, at 17 (recommending that prosecutors 
“share views and practices on [Realignment] sentencing options and seek to establish at least 
general norms and presumptions to somewhat reduce the problem of extreme unpredictabil-
ity and disparity”); Weisberg & Quan, supra note 236, at 59 (making a similar recommenda-
tion for judges). 
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3. Fast-Track Plea Agreements 
Various federal sentencing debates likewise look different through 
our prism, which breaks disparity into a rainbow of variations, causes, 
and rationales. One is the use of fast-track plea agreements in immigra-
tion and drug cases. These rule-based, centrally sanctioned regional var-
iations occupy a middle ground between free-for-all local variations and 
geographically uniform outcomes. Multiple federal districts, most but 
not all along the southwestern border, offer deep plea-bargained dis-
counts as parts of package deals that greatly expedite case processing, 
with the specific prior approval of the Attorney General under the Pros-
ecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today (“PROTECT”) Act.245 Rather than taking an aggravated illegal 
reentry case to trial, prosecutors might drop all statutory enhancements 
in exchange for a defendant’s waiver of indictment, discovery, trial, 
presentencing report, and appellate rights at the initial appearance.246 In 
exchange for immediate guilty pleas and sentencing, defendants get 
agreed-upon departures and much lower sentences, while prosecutors 
can process far more cases using far fewer resources. By doing so, fed-
eral prosecutors in one district might pursue a high-volume, low-price 
strategy, even as neighboring federal districts pursue a low-volume, 
high-price approach, reserving sanctions for the worst of the worst.247 
Critics argue for equalizing these practices, emphasizing the interjuris-
dictional sentencing disparities they create and that immigration, espe-
cially human trafficking, is an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction and 
 
245 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012); see Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. 
Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy Paradox of Early Disposition Pro-
grams: A Primer on “Fast-Track” Sentences, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 517, 517–19 (2006) (providing 
an overview of fast-track sentencing, including a review of the PROTECT Act, in the con-
text of prosecutions after illegal reentry after deportation). 
246 See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002). 
247 See, e.g., Jeffery T. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 
Four U.S. District Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 Symbolic Interaction 255, 262–
72 (2005) (comparing and contrasting different prosecutorial plea bargaining and sentencing 
strategies in four federal districts under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
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national concern.248 Drug smuggling, while an area of concurrent juris-
diction, is likewise a problem of national scope.249 
But emphasizing disparity or the federal nature of immigration and 
drug crimes without more does little to tell us whether these sentencing 
variations are justified, just as analogous emphases do not much help in 
analyzing the intrastate disparities that Realignment spawned. One more 
specific argument against them might turn on spillovers. A uniform ap-
proach to punishing immigration and drug crimes, the argument would 
go, is needed to avoid externalizing the costs of those crimes onto other 
areas.250 To make that claim, one would have to be able to maintain that, 
from the criminal’s perspective, one of the two approaches to punish-
ment—high-volume, low-price, or low-volume, high-price—is material-
ly more attractive (or, perhaps more accurately, materially less unattrac-
tive) than the other. Ex ante, the answer is not obvious. Assuming the 
two approaches are not a wash, though, that might be a good reason to 
tamp down on the disparate sentences. The aim of punishment, after all, 
should not ordinarily be to merely shift crime from one place to anoth-
er.251 
There are, however, respectable counterarguments. By capturing a 
higher volume of offenders, fast-track programs might reduce the hidden 
disparity between those who are and are not prosecuted at all, thereby 
righting another imbalance that is a function of decisions made earlier in 
the criminal justice pipeline. Similarly, applying the high-price but high-
resource strategy in districts swamped with cross-border crimes might 
result in underprotecting local citizens from certain gun, violent, and 
 
248 See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 3, at 479–80; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy 
Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys, at 2 (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/f
iles/dag/legacy/2012/01/31/fast-track-program.pdf [https://perma.cc/PRC3-6QM5] (noting 
that “[t]he existence of [fast-track] programs in some, but not all, districts has generated a 
concern that defendants are being treated differently depending on where in the United 
States they are charged and sentenced,” and that some courts in non-fast-track districts grant 
fast-track departures that “introduce additional sentencing disparities”). 
249 See, e.g., Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-
Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 Emory L.J. 1, 37–49 (2012) (discussing concurrent fed-
eral and state jurisdiction over drug trafficking crimes and the factors that push some cases 
into federal instead of state court). 
250 See Neil Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385, 2421 (1997) 
(describing how disparate approaches to punishment can result in the “geographic substitu-
tion” of crime). 
251 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1039, 1133–35 
(2002) (critiquing architectural solutions to crime on the grounds that they may simply shift 
crime to different locations). 
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gang crimes that need to be enforced everywhere and are often best han-
dled at the federal level.252 The low-price strategy could allow the feds to 
more effectively pursue the worst of those crimes while devoting com-
paratively fewer resources to things like drug crimes that many believe 
are best left to states and localities.253 More generally, border districts 
face unique local burdens and problems—such as heavy strains on both 
local and federal criminal justice resources—that might demand locale-
specific responses at the federal level.254 Varying the federal approach 
might be a useful avenue for making even purely federal policy, allow-
ing federal prosecutors to experiment with what works best instead of 
adopting a one-size-fits-all, all-or-nothing strategy. 
It might seem strange for federal sentencing policy to vary from place 
to place. But it is not obviously stranger than state punishment policy 
varying from county to county under Realignment. The PROTECT Act, 
by expressly authorizing fast-track programs with the approval of Main 
Justice, also ensured that Main Justice can verify the need for and regu-
late district-by-district sentencing variations.255 Had it not, the fast-track 
debate would be even more complicated, raising difficult questions 
about the authority of U.S. Attorneys to vary their sentencing practices 
significantly without prior congressional or at least high-level executive 
approval.256 But even then, some wiggle room exists to argue that local 
 
252 See United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that “[t]he 
[fast-track] policy benefits the government and court system by relieving court congestion”); 
Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Margin: Reinventing Prosecution 
Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 285, 301–02 (1998) (argu-
ing that federal fast-track programs “enhance[] security[] while reducing the costs of extend-
ed incarceration and prosecution”). Of course, not everyone believes that the federal gov-
ernment should be as involved in these areas as it is. For a brief history of the debate and a 
sampling of arguments on the other side, see Ouziel, supra note 138, at 2238–39, 2238 nn.1–
3. 
253 See Beale, supra note 49, at 1008–10 (arguing that federal resources could better be 
used to supplement state criminal law enforcement in various ways); John S. Baker, Jr., State 
Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 673, 673–74, 678 
(1999). 
254 This was, in fact, the original justification for federal fast-track programs. See Memo-
randum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors, at 2 (Sept. 22, 2003), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm [https://perma.c
c/4BQK-9GHV].  
255 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012). 
256 See, e.g., Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration, supra note 119, at 852–
56 (discussing interplay between district-by-district disparities in federal prosecutorial charg-
ing, bargaining, and sentencing decisions and presidential control of enforcement). Such 
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U.S. Attorneys can adjust federal punishment policy to accommodate 
local conditions and views.257 At the end of the day, deciding how far 
they can go requires giving weight to both national and local voices, to 
both principle and practical concerns and tradeoffs. 
Fast-track programs are not necessarily ideal, or even good. They may 
require scrutiny and explanation on procedural as well as substantive 
grounds, and it is reasonable to question why some districts well inside 
the heartland of the country need to engage in the same shortcuts. Ob-
serving disparity may begin the conversation, but cannot end it.258 
C. Caveats and Limitations 
As we explained earlier, even for more flexible notions of equality, 
outcomes still matter, and variations are not an unqualified good. Our 
broadening of the terms of debate raises several concerns about sorting 
good variations from bad ones that are critical to keep in mind when 
considering more elastic approaches to sentencing equality. First, there 
are fears of arbitrariness. That certainly was Judge Marvin Frankel’s po-
sition, pitting what he saw as arbitrary and lawless sentencing discretion 
against the rule of law.259 While Judge Frankel has a point, it must not be 
overstated. It helps to distinguish arbitrary from random variations. 
Some variations are arbitrary: They defy any reasoned explanation.260 
Think of a judge who is grumpy because he is overdue to eat lunch,261 or 
 
questions of authority are far less significant at the state level given our country’s longstand-
ing tradition of local law enforcement control over state criminal justice. 
257 See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep’t of Justice 
Components and U.S. Attorneys 1 (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/defa
ult/files/ag/legacy/2014/04/11/ag-memo-substantial-federal-interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HY2B-SA3B] (acknowledging that there will be regional variation in federal prosecutorial 
priorities based on “local criminal threats and needs”).  
258 This is a more nuanced assessment than one of us previously provided on this issue. 
See Bibas, supra note 50, at 137–38. 
259 See Frankel, supra note 31, at 5.  
260 See, e.g., Christine N. Cimini, Principles of Non-Arbitrariness: Lawlessness in the Ad-
ministration of Welfare, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 451, 473 (2005) (defining arbitrary governmen-
tal action as action exhibiting “no rational relationship between the government’s ends and 
the means it employs”); R. George Wright, Arbitrariness: Why the Most Important Idea in 
Administrative Law Can’t Be Defined, and What This Means for the Law in General, 44 U. 
Rich. L. Rev. 839, 840 (2010) (explaining that “arbitrariness often takes the form of capri-
ciousness, with uncertainty or variability then resulting”).  
261 See Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 Proc. Nat’l 
Acad. Sci. U.S. 6889, 6889–90 (2011) (study of eight Israeli judges showing that a judge’s 
decision “can be influenced by whether the judge took a break to eat”). 
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a parent who overpunishes a child because he had a bad day at work. 
Judge Frankel was right to call for reforms to structure deliberation and 
encourage some kind of reason giving. That deliberation can sometimes 
be private (think of jury deliberations on death sentences or damages). 
But it can also be public, as when a judge issues an oral or written opin-
ion that gives publicly accessible reasons and is subject to objection, 
criticism, and appellate review. The discipline of having to offer reasons 
itself tamps down on biased, arbitrary, or unjustifiable variation without 
preventing variation per se.262 That insight has long been a foundation of 
administrative law and, as we have argued elsewhere, it could do more 
to inform criminal sentencing.263 
But variation can be random without being arbitrary. Think of a po-
lice checkpoint that stops every fifth car, or a clerk of court who wheels 
one case out to a stern retributive judge and another to a more rehabilita-
tive judge. Though there is variation, each judge ultimately justifies each 
sentence in terms of reasons and policies that are subject to review and 
contribute to broader public debate.264 If the process is ex ante identical 
and fair and the variations have reasoned explanations, one cannot call 
the sentence arbitrary, even though there is dispersion around some 
mean or bell curve.265 To be sure, there may be legitimate notice and 
rule-of-law objections if the dispersion is too wide. But there are also 
 
262 As Kevin Stack elegantly puts it, “reason-giving is a precondition to, and the object of, 
deference.” Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 355, 398 (2012); 
see also Martin Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration 48–
50 (1988) (exploring the interplay between deference and reason giving); cf. Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring administra-
tive agency to “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational con-
nection between the facts found and the choice made’” (citation omitted)). 
263 See Bierschbach & Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, supra note 118, at 15–17. 
264 On the distinction between arbitrary and random differences, see Michael Abramowicz 
et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929, 967–74 (2011) (describing differences be-
tween random and nonrandom arbitrariness). 
265 See Chiao, supra note 4, at 323 (“[S]entencing takes on a lottery-like character when 
viewed externally . . . . But it remains a merits-based, case-by-case adjudicatory process 
from within the internal, deliberative point of view of the relevant legal actors.”). The prob-
lem with “pure” randomization in punishment is not that it creates disparities per se; it is that 
the punishment that flows from it is divorced from any reasoned, merits-based consideration 
of the person being punished. For different though complementary defenses of randomness, 
see Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuar-
ial Age 237–39 (2007); Harcourt, supra note 196; Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, 
Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809, 810, 815–16 (2011); 
and Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 17–24 
(2009). 
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countervailing benefits of diversity and experimentation. If feedback 
loops work well (and we admit that is a big “if”), natural experiments 
allow researchers (and sentencing commissions) to learn what works 
best and to improve sentencing through repeated iterations over time. 
Arbitrariness needs to be defined more narrowly and clearly as sen-
tencing based on factors that are irrelevant to any legitimate purposes 
and values of punishment.266 Some variations are legitimate, and not ar-
bitrary, even if they are more finely textured than existing doctrine rec-
ognizes. Paul Robinson and his coauthors find that numerous extralegal 
punishment factors are considered relevant by substantial numbers of 
citizens, including a defendant’s remorse, apology, restitution, other suf-
fering, family circumstances, or good works or a victim’s forgiveness.267 
These factors may not show up in existing law and may resist easy codi-
fication. But that is the nature of ex post, context-specific judgment, and 
our modest analytical point is only that sentencing should not place such 
variations in the same normative box with truly arbitrary divergences. 
Effecting that notion will not be easy under current sentencing doctrine. 
But regulating with a lighter hand, while simultaneously trying harder to 
elicit sentencers’ explanations and patterns of decision, might help to 
distinguish between the two.268 
A second issue is the relevance of sentencers’ subjective motivations 
and intentions, whether conscious or unconscious, and our ability to as-
certain them given punishment’s overdetermined nature. Does one wor-
ry only about disparate treatment motivated by race, ethnicity, religion, 
wealth, or other impermissible factors? Or do we also try to stamp out 
disparate sentencing impacts when, for instance, consideration of an of-
fender’s education or job prospects hurts minority defendants most, or 
because we can never know for sure whether conscious or unconscious 
bias has infected the process? We do not take sides in that debate, but  
 
266 Cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010) (noting that a sentence is not dispropor-
tionate as long as it advances “the goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized as le-
gitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation” (citing Ewing v. Cali-
fornia, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003))). 
267 Robinson et al., supra note 77, 789 tbl.8. 
268 Some states, like Minnesota, have made some progress along these lines. See Michael 
Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and Their Effects, in Andrew von Hirsch et al., The Sentenc-
ing Commission and Its Guidelines 16, 42 (1987) (discussing the relationship of Minnesota’s 
presumptive guidelines to its emerging “meaningful system of appellate sentence review”). 
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want rather to flag it.269 There may also be a middle ground in which 
disparities serve as yellow flags, not red ones. Data patterns can smoke 
out possibly biased or arbitrary variations, but doctrine could require and 
allow sentencing bodies to justify and explain those variations.270 That is 
not a complete answer, because low-visibility discretion often makes it 
impossible to say for sure why sentences vary. And it also does not an-
swer the difficult normative question of what to do with characteristics 
like education and job prospects that might correlate strongly with both 
an increased risk of recidivism and with race. But it can at least start fo-
cusing the conversation on disaggregating types of and reasons for varia-
tion. Even explicitly embracing disparate-impact reasoning at sentencing 
would still be narrower, and likely more useful, than lumping all varia-
tions together. Beyond disparate-impact data, as we suggested earlier, 
more process- instead of outcomes-focused equality reforms—such as 
Shima Baradaran Baughman’s proposal to use “prosecutorial blinding” 
to tamp down on racial, gender, or other impermissible factors in charg-
ing decisions271—can work to address subjective biases in ways that still 
accommodate some of the upsides of variation. 
 
269 The debate is deep and longstanding. For a sample of the arguments on both sides, see 
Vada Berger et al., Comment, Too Much Justice: A Legislative Response to McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 437, 496–528 (1989) (outlining arguments regarding ra-
cial disparities in sentencing). 
270 Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432–36 (1971) (establishing a similar ap-
proach to adjudicating  
 claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). That dynamic is what led to reform 
of the 100:1 federal crack to powder cocaine ratio. See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Essay, Sorry 
Seems to Be the Hardest Word: The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Crack, and Methamphet-
amine, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 765, 790–93 (2011) (detailing the circumstances leading to the 
passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010). That change required a statutory amendment to 
a statutorily prescribed penalty, but a similar dynamic can, and often does, operate to moni-
tor aggregated, highly discretionary decisions. The debate over and ultimate repeal of New 
York City’s stop-and-frisk policy in light of its clearly disproportionate impact on African 
Americans is an example. See Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk 
Policy, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-
and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html.  
271 Email from Shima Baradaran Baughman, Professor, Univ. of Utah Coll. Of Law, to 
Richard A. Bierschbach et al. (July 7, 2014) (on file with authors) (discussing “prosecutorial 
mercy and blinding”). This particular reform would be hard to implement directly at sentenc-
ing itself. While prosecutors make decisions largely on the basis of a paper record or contact 
with opposing counsel, the Constitution compels that defendants be personally present at 
sentencing. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884). Having said that, presentence re-
ports and similar preparatory work already has anchored much of a sentence at that point an-
yway, so similar reforms might be brought to bear on at least some aspects of those presen-
tencing processes. Going too far in the direction of blinding also would carry costs that 
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Third, American criminal justice is already highly localized and 
fragmented. Like the history of federalism, the history of localism in 
criminal justice has not always been pretty. One might reasonably worry 
that conceptions of equality that provide more leeway for localized sen-
tencing variations could open the door to rolling back progress and mak-
ing sentencing even more hidden and opaque—and thus potentially 
more unequal—than before.272 That is a serious concern, and it under-
scores the importance of doctrinal reforms that can facilitate reason giv-
ing, flag potentially problematic variations, and more carefully distin-
guish benign or beneficial variations from impermissible or unconstitu-
tional ones. On a broader level, though, it is worth noting that there is 
real and ongoing debate about whether capital and noncapital sentencing 
have grown significantly more equal in terms of race, ethnicity, and 
class as they have become more centralized and top-down over the last 
four decades. Carol and Jordan Steiker have lamented that decades of 
“tinker[ing] with the machinery of death” have not produced meaningful 
improvements in equalizing who lives and who dies.273 And in noncapi-
tal sentencing, supporters and opponents of sentencing guidelines each 
marshal bevies of empirical studies purporting to show that guidelines 
have made disparities better or worse.274 There certainly is room to de-
bate the costs and tradeoffs of pursuing equality through top-down rules 
versus bottom-up local approaches.275 Even if one favors equalizing out-
comes, the politics of criminal justice at the state level might well lead to 
“leveling-up” of sentences through centralized guidelines or statutes that 
overpunish and that in practice are often applied unequally anyway. 
 
might well outweigh the benefits, notably stripping away needed context surrounding the 
offender, victim, and crime. But the general idea is worth considering. 
272 See, e.g., W. David Ball, Defunding State Prisons, 50 Crim. L. Bull. 1060, 1083 (2014), 
(noting concern that more localism in criminal justice “would enshrine disparate treatment of 
local populations”); Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
1171, 1218–19 (2011) (noting accountability- and equality-based objections to localism in 
policing). 
273 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 110, at 359 (quoting Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 
1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)); id. at 357–60, 402. 
274 See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Dispari-
ty, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 161, 188–89 (1991) (finding that disparity has worsened); Klein & 
Steiker, supra note 189, at 232–33 (finding that disparity has improved). 
275 Cf. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1982 (arguing that “criminal justice systems governed by 
local politics should achieve more egalitarian results than justice systems that are more cen-
tralized, legalized, and bureaucratized”). 
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For that reason, it is not obvious that centralizing power and pushing 
it up to higher state and federal levels leads to more transparency, more 
accountability, and, ultimately, better sentencing policy. The pathologies 
of mandatory minimum sentencing, and the one-upmanship over federal 
crack sentences, are only the best-known examples.276 At least in some 
settings, it is possible that community policing, community prosecution, 
drug courts, restorative justice, and the like might in practice be more 
transparent, more participatory, more accountable, and result in fairer 
sentencing across the board.277 That might be true in part because they 
are tied to real victims and real defendants, who are neighbors and not 
sound bites.278 It might be true in part because of the political dynamics 
of criminal justice, as Bill Stuntz argued when he made the case that lo-
calized control by political machines resulted in a more egalitarian crim-
inal justice than we have today.279 It might be true partly because a local 
voice in sentencing policy legitimates the sanctions that local juries are 
asked to endorse, or better forces localities to internalize the full costs 
and benefits of punishment.280 We do not know for sure if, when, or how 
that is true. But these are empirical questions that cannot be answered a 
priori. We need to descend to ground-level issues of institutional design 
and political dynamics to answer these questions, and the answers may 
 
276 See LaJuana Davis, Rock, Powder, Sentencing—Making Disparate Impact Evidence 
Relevant in Crack Cocaine Sentencing, 14 J. Gender Race & Just. 375, 404 (2011) (discuss-
ing the “cautionary tale” of racial disparities in mandatory minimum sentencing for crack 
cocaine). 
277 See, e.g., Ball, supra note 272, at 1084 (noting that “[c]entralization allows a state to 
more easily hide its inequalities” by lumping much of sentencing together, whereas dis-
aggregation highlights “actual, extant distinctions among localities” and enables “[e]veryone 
[to] see which counties are doing better and which ones worse”); Michael M. O’Hear, Re-
thinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial Injustice, 20 Stan. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 463, 487–99 (2009) (arguing that better use of participatory and inclusive restora-
tive processes could help address some of the racial disparity problems associated with tradi-
tional drug courts). 
278 See Paul H. Robinson, Some Doubts About Argument by Hypothetical, 88 Calif. L. 
Rev. 813, 820–21 (2000) (observing that “people want to know the ‘story’” when making 
decisions about punishment, that “[s]mall facts of every sort can make a difference to a per-
son’s blameworthiness judgment,” and that abstract hypotheticals that lack detail are thus 
“dangerous” guideposts for punishment determinations); see also supra note 160 (citing ad-
ditional sources). 
279 Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1996–97. 
280 See Ball, supra note 272, at 1077 (explaining how more complete local control over 
criminal justice would “internalize all the effects of criminal justice interventions”); Ouziel, 
supra note 138, at 2322–27 (discussing the relationship between greater local voice in crimi-
nal justice, the criminal law’s moral credibility, and substantive justice). 
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differ depending on the crime, the type of variation, and the strengths 
and powers of the various stakeholders.281 Those are the kinds of inquir-
ies and tradeoffs that we need to debate. They are messier and more var-
iable, but in the long run may prove more fruitful. 
Finally, there are other notice and rule-of-law concerns. One might 
plausibly fear that too much variation undercuts not only deterrence, but 
the very idea of making the law clear and predictable. But this may be 
an area where Meir Dan-Cohen’s distinction between conduct rules and 
decision rules is a good thing.282 It is very important for citizens to know 
what is a crime, so they can avoid violating the law. But the idea that 
culpable criminals also know with accuracy the sanctions they face is 
largely a fiction, and its impact on deterrence is likely overstated in any 
event.283 Rule-of-law values certainly still support some measure of 
transparency and consistency, but a fair and predictable process might 
suffice for that even if the sentence is not fully knowable before the 
crime. 
CONCLUSION 
Our goal in this Article has been primarily analytical: to break down 
and scrutinize equality in sentencing, explaining how it operates in prac-
tice substantively and structurally. The stale sentencing debates of equal-
ity versus individualization and rules versus standards need to stop treat-
ing equality as if it were a single concept. In practice, it is a number of 
 
281 Cf. Barkow & O’Neill, supra note 20, at 1974–77 (studying the political and economic 
factors that influence the delegation of sentencing power through commissions and guide-
lines at the state level); Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 
90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870, 912–37 (2015) (showing how federal law enforcement subsidies can 
alter the priorities, accountability, and on-the-ground effects of local policing in particular 
substantive areas); Ouziel, supra note 138, at 2323–30 (disaggregating benefits of local con-
trol over criminal justice based on different types of crimes at issue). 
282 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 625–26, 630–42 (1984). 
283 Because police and prosecutors rarely disclose their enforcement strategies, only sea-
soned criminals are likely to have any real sense of what the realistic punishment for their 
conduct is likely to be. See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating 
Behavior, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 655, 686 (2006). Deterrence, moreover, is at least as much 
normative as it is coercive. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 591, 603–04 (1996). And to the extent that deterrence is coercive, it is the cer-
tainty and not the severity of the punishment that matters most. See Jeffrey Grogger, Certain-
ty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 Econ. Inquiry 297, 307–08 (1991); Ann Dryden Witte, Es-
timating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data, 94 Q.J. Econ. 57, 79 (1980). 
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conceptions—a panoply of equalities with a range of pros and cons. Sen-
tencing policy and scholarship have often conflated one debatable ap-
proach—one might even call it a superficial or false equality—with 
equality itself. Measures that further the reigning conception of equality 
can undercut others while simultaneously skewing sentencing toward 
certain purposes of punishment and a certain approach to institutional 
design. Mandatory or mechanical sentencing rules may promote a cen-
tralized approach to general deterrence at the expense of the disaggrega-
tion and experimentation of localism or the flexible, rehabilitative, and 
process-focused sentencing of restorative justice. Three-strikes laws 
might promote general incapacitation and uniformity, but dilute selec-
tive incapacitation and the variation that inheres in it. Normatively, we 
see some virtues in a less outcomes-focused conception of sentencing 
equality. But regardless whether one agrees with us about that, we hope 
to have at least illuminated the substantive and institutional dimensions 
of equalizing outcomes and stamping out many different types of varia-
tion in punishment. The tradeoffs in doing so are complex and underap-
preciated. Different factors cut different ways in different contexts for 
different types of sentencing equality and different ways of achieving it. 
Some pockets of sentencing have begun to recognize that complexity. 
Misdemeanor law and scholarship are more open to outcomes variation 
in exchange for the benefits of targeted lenience, diversion, treatment, 
and tailoring sentences to the needs and preferences of affected commu-
nities.284 So too is the law of corporate crime, which adjusts sanctions to 
best fit the pathologies of organizational perpetrators, the needs of 
stakeholders, and the interests of the public.285 But in the felony-centric 
world of mainstream sentencing debate,286 equality of outcomes exerts a 
 
284 See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 157 at 841–51  (discussing 
how the structure and focus of drug treatment courts permit flexibility in handling each indi-
vidual case); Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Lecture, 81 St. John’s L. Rev. 743, 748–49 (2007) (de-
scribing the implementation of problem-solving courts in New York and their malleable, col-
laborative approach to justice for low-level offenders); Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon’s Serv-
ants and the Criminalization of Poverty, 12 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 445, 463–64 (2015) (noting 
the complex relationship of commitments to equality and fairness and the evolution of prob-
lem-solving approaches to criminal justice, particularly “where defendants are poorest and 
offenses are pettiest”).  
285 That practice is not without serious criticism on a number of grounds. For an excellent 
overview, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big To Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise 
with Corporations 1–2, 142, 155–60 (2014). Interestingly, though, inequality of outcomes 
among corporate defendants is almost never one of them. 
286 We thank Sasha Natapoff for the characterization. 
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heavy pull. Why, one might ask, should our conception of sentencing 
equality vary with the level of crime charged or the corporate character 
of the perpetrator? It is noteworthy, yet rarely noted, that prosecutors 
unilaterally decide how to operationalize sentencing equality when they 
decide whether to seek retribution and deterrence (by filing felony 
charges) or rehabilitation and restoration (in juvenile court, misdemean-
or court, diversion programs, or corporate and white-collar alternative 
sanctions). More work is needed to explore how to harmonize the con-
cept of equality with the broad normative discretion that prosecutors and 
others exercise when placing cases into different baskets. 
We cannot end these debates, but we hope to invigorate them with a 
fresh perspective. Disparity is a buzzword, but it often conceals more 
than it reveals.287 The reasons for a disparity, the substantive policies it 
serves, and the structures and procedures that breed it all matter. Not all 
disparity amounts to arbitrariness or discrimination, and not all punish-
ment need be ex ante general deterrence. In assessing disparities in sen-
tencing, criminal procedure must do more to account for a range of sub-
stantive values important to punishment as well as the institutions that 
weigh and apply them. Sometimes that calls for nationalized, central-
ized, deterrence-focused sentencing, but sometimes it does not. Focusing 
too much on equalizing sentencing outcomes as our main measure of 
sentencing fairness hides other moral and political considerations that 
criminal justice must confront. 
 
 
287 Former U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner has bluntly stated that “[d]isparity-speak has 
sucked the air out of all interesting and meaningful discussion of criminal justice reform for 
the past several decades.” Judge Nancy Gertner, How to Talk About Sentencing Policy—and 
Not Disparity, 46 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 313, 313 (2014). 
